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Summary 
With the Chapultepec Peace Accords, signed on 16 January 1992, the twelve-year civil war 
in El Salvador came to an end, having claimed 75,000 victims. While the peace making is 
documented as a model case, the subsequent peace building proved to be far from quite 
so exemplary. It brought a variety of ambivalent factors to light. The most crucial of these 
was the fact that although a stable, concurrent period of peace (i.e. absence of war) has 
been achieved in El Salvador, the same cannot be said of any civilized life for its citizens 
(in the sense of a fundamental freedom from violence). On the contrary, El Salvador cur-
rently has the highest levels of violence in Latin America. Moreover, the present violence 
is almost exclusively criminal in nature, rather than still political.  
The aim of this report is to explain why post-war levels of violence in El Salvador have 
remained so high to date, and the highest in Central America, despite the fact that socio-
economic and political indicators are really positive, more positive than in any other 
country in Central America, with the exception of Costa Rica, and including even Nicara-
gua, which has very much lower levels of violence than El Salvador. Any investigation of 
this must look for factors which have just as pronounced an effect as violence, so that a 
correlation between them and high levels of violence can be established, and causality 
derived on this basis. The report identifies high rates of migration, and of the remittances 
(remesas) associated with it, as a key causal factor for the high incidence of violence. Re-
mittances are income earned by working abroad, which the (in this case Salvadoran) mi-
grants send back home, mainly from the USA. The title of this report, “From Exodus to 
Exitus”, derives from this. A secondary causal factor, but nonetheless a crucial trigger, is 
identified as a specific combination of poor performance and repressive behaviour by the 
security sector (police, judiciary and penal system). This accounts for the peaks and the 
trough in the sine curve progression of post-war homicide rates. 
In order to prove that migration and remittances are crucial causal factors in violence, 
the report will first highlight the exceptionally high volume of Salvadoran migration, most 
notably to the USA, in comparison with the rest of Central America. Next, proof will be 
provided of the particularly high value of remittances within the (socio)economic struc-
ture of El Salvador, and the implications of this for the loss of importance of local produc-
tion and labour. Following this, the exceptionally high value of Salvadoran remittances in 
comparison with the rest of Central America, and the correlation of rates of remittances 
and levels of violence on the isthmus will be illustrated, so as ultimately to show the same 
correlation within El Salvador itself. Finally, the example of El Salvador will be used to 
demonstrate the causality between extremely high rates of remittances and levels of vio-
lence. In conclusion it will be established that migration and remittances therefore lead to 
high levels of violence, because they:  
– draw off “excess pressure”, dangerous to the system, by providing a (new) outlet for 
inherited oligarchic structures, which basically promote violence;  
– create economic structures, which for reasons of deprivation or frustration suggest the 
use of violence as a way of accessing the market to those who do not receive remittances;  
  II 
– create and sustain a social void in their immediate context in both the country from 
which funds or people are being sent and that receiving them, which on the one hand 
destroys social capital and gives rise to a state of anomie, and on the other generates a 
need for new social capital and structure, although the social capital is perverse because it 
is linked with a violence which is only able to provide itself with a partial structure and 
otherwise generates anomic violence. 
As a consequence, violence evolves into a substitute way of accessing the market for the 
lower classes, something they cannot guarantee to be able to do relying only on their own 
labour or remittances. This also supports the hypothesis that the frustrations leading to 
violence are caused by relative deprivation, although at a low level, which primarily affects 
the second and third quintiles (from below) of the population.  
The report will illustrate the poor performance and repressive behaviour of the secu-
rity sector in terms of strategies and institutions alike. It will distinguish between three 
strategic phases: 1) the phase of transition to a more democratic regime and revival of the 
security sector by putting new or revived institutions into action, without the issue of 
violence being recognized as such (1992-1996), 2) the transition phase, during which the 
solution adopted in the face of the violence problem was partial institutional reform and 
centralization of security policy, along with reforms and counter-reforms in penal legisla-
tion, and the development of a repressive security policy (1996-2003), and 3) the phase of 
repressive security policy in the form of the (súper) mano dura ((super) heavy hand) pro-
gramme, although this is being replaced (from 2003) with elements of new approaches - 
the mano amiga (amicable hand) and mano extendida (outstretched hand) plans - aimed 
at social prevention and reintegration respectively. 
As far as institutions are concerned, the police are under-resourced and ill-equipped to 
an extent that they commit human rights abuses and exercise their powers arbitrarily, as 
well as being linked with organized crime and showing militaristic tendencies. Equally, 
lamentable aspects of the judiciary include lack of independence, an inadequate focus on 
law and order and basic incompetence. The serious deficiencies in both institutions lead 
to an enormously high level of exemption from punishment. The penal system is charac-
terized by over-crowding and inhumane prison conditions, as well as by lack of supervi-
sion and increasing criminalization. The guilty walk free, while the innocent are impris-
oned. At an institutional level, violent crime in El Salvador can be attributed to the fact 
that the political regime, irrespective of whether it is repressive or not, is unable to plug 
the gaps left behind by the poor performance of its institutions. 
By way of conclusion, the report points to the current exodus of Salvadorans and like-
wise their “exitus” (or death) in large numbers as the sign of a perverse globalization, of new 
rents and of violence, since both remittances and perpetrators of violence such as the maras 
are global phenomena. This is a lose-lose situation, because ultimately the funds raised 
through remittances are swallowed up by the cost of violence.  
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1. Introduction 
The violence in El Salvador is no less evident, nor is it any less cruel, than its counterparts 
in Afghanistan, the DR Congo or Palestine. Nonetheless it attracts far less attention in 
Germany, from either politicians or academics. The Salvadoran media do not spare the 
observer any details of the atrocities however: split skulls, heads with no bodies, corpses 
with amputated limbs; and always accompanied by those young men with bare torsos 
known as mareros, presented as the suspected or actual perpetrators in a highly sensation-
alist manner. Translating the atrocity into less emotive statistics reveals that, with 56.2 
homicides1 per 100,000 inhabitants, El Salvador currently occupies first place in the statis-
tics for violence2 in Central America, indeed in Latin America as well, way in front of Co-
lombia, which in contrast to El Salvador is currently engaged in a civil war and has a rate 
of “only” 39. Furthermore, El Salvador has already been at peace3 for fifteen years. The 
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in this country is not only greater than that in those 
Central American countries with a relatively low level of violence – Costa Rica (8.1) and 
Nicaragua (3.4) – by about 50 percentage points, but also than that of both the most vio-
lent countries in the region – Honduras (46.2) and Guatemala (37.53). 
Paradoxically however, El Salvador is also way ahead of the region (with the exception 
of special case Costa Rica, in all below) with regard to the most important socioeconomic 
indicators, most notably leaving Nicaragua with its low level of violence way behind it. Its 
Human Development Index is 11 points better than Nicaragua’s and 16 and 17 points 
better than those of Honduras and Guatemala. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
ranks El Salvador in 30th place in terms of the Status Index and in 27th place in terms of 
the Management Index. Honduras in contrast is ranked 53rd/54th, Guatemala 70th/57th 
and Nicaragua 57th/55th. Per head El Salvador has a national income of USD 4.371, Gua-
temala achieves USD 2.906, Honduras USD 1.909 and Nicaragua only USD 1.615. El Sal-
vador has by far the lowest percentage of households living in poverty or extreme poverty. 
The Gini coefficient, used to measure general inequality, comes to 0.518 in El Salvador; it 
is lower only in Costa Rica, and highest in Nicaragua at 0.584. 
Considering that El Salvador, unlike Guatemala, no longer has any problems with ra-
cism either, because the indígenas here were wiped out in 1932, and that the country is not 
only classified as “free” in terms of relevant democratic indices such as Freedom House, 
but even achieves slightly better results than the other Central American countries (again 
with the exception of Costa Rica), the political factors which are normally perceived to be 
causes of violence cannot be valid as causal factors here. The argument that El Salvador has 
this much violence because it is so small and so densely populated no longer carries any 
weight when countries such as Hong Kong or Singapore are brought into the equation.  
 
 
1 “Homicide” is the umbrella term for murder and manslaughter. 
2 “Violence” is understood in the following text to mean only the intentional physical harming of other 
people. 
3 “Peace” is here defined to be the absence of war. 
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The claim that wartime violence is being perpetuated in a different form can be refuted 
in at least three ways. Firstly, the explanatory power of this factor is diminished by Nica-
ragua, with its low level of violence, because during the war it had a homicide rate equally 
as high (138/1977-1979) as or much higher (208/1981-1989) than El Salvador (138/1981-
1992), but the present homicide rate in Nicaragua is much lower than that in El Salvador. 
Secondly, it is precisely those regions in El Salvador which were the worst affected by the 
civil war, such as Morazán and Chalatenango, which now have the lowest level of vio-
lence, with the result that in some places in these regions it is not even considered neces-
sary to station police units. Thirdly, the argument that it is ex-combatants or their chil-
dren who are responsible for perpetrating violence nowadays also fails to hold weight. On 
the one hand, this is partly to do with the remarkable cohesion of both wartime parties, 
accompanied by a particular level of discipline which continues to make its effects felt 
since the war. On the other, it can be ascribed to the fact that ex-guerrilleros generally give 
their children a political upbringing, whereas modern perpetrators of violence are crimi-
nal and have no political motives or interests. The regions once so badly affected by the 
civil war have a low level of violence precisely because, among other reasons, ex-
guerrilleros have settled there, and they take it into their own hands to ensure that mareros 
and other perpetrators of violence do not set foot there (González, L. 2006; Linares 2006). 
Unlike certain African countries, in the case of El Salvador (and also of Guatemala) it is 
therefore not possible to attribute the high level of violence to clashes between ex-
combatants from the civil war.  
The question arising from the extremely negative homicide rates on the one hand, and 
from the positive, by Central American standards, socioeconomic and also political indi-
cators on the other, is as clear as the puzzle it brings to light: How is this contradiction to 
be explained? Elsewhere I have drawn up a causal model, which explains why in three 
Central American countries there are such high levels of violence and in two countries 
such low ones (cf. Zinecker 2006 a; Zinecker 2006 b: 129-174). The model can be applied 
to El Salvador. In this report however the aim is not only, or not primarily, to explain why 
El Salvador, like Guatemala and Honduras, has a vastly higher level of violence than Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua. Instead it will investigate why, when compared to both the other 
countries in the region with a high intensity of violence, Honduras and Guatemala, vio-
lence in El Salvador is ahead of them by quite such a long way. The hypothesis to be tested 
is: while high levels of violence per se can be explained by other factors, in comparison to 
the rest of Central America in El Salvador two causal factors underlie its extremely high 
levels of violence:  
1) in the context of recent globalization, a particularly high rate of migration and associ-
ated rate of remittances (foreign workers’ rents), which have transformed the country’s 
currency, surplus and income structure at least as radically as the country’s foray into 
exporting coffee, and later into import substitution industrialization, once did. If the 
failure of this industrialization, along with other factors, was a root cause of the Salva-
doran civil war from 1981-1992, it can be assumed that the transformation to a remit-
tance economy is having a similar causal effect upon post-war violence;   
2) a poor performance linked with a high degree of repressive behaviour on the part of the 
security sector (police and judiciary). The lowest figure for homicide rates in the post-
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war period was achieved in El Salvador in 2003, and then this rose to a figure comparable 
with the general offensive of the first year of the civil war, but then again 2003 was also 
the year in which the repressive mano dura government policy aimed at violent crime 
was introduced, the effect of which trickled, gradually, into the ensuing years.  
I will show that the first factor – the unprecedented exodus of Salvadorans and its conse-
quences – is better able than the second to explain the levels of violence unique to El Sal-
vador – the omnipresent, unnatural “exitus” (or death). This is also the explanation be-
hind the title of this report. The second factor – the performance of the security sector –
explains on the other hand the dynamic of the Salvadoran level of violence over time. 
There has so far been no systematic analysis of Salvadoran post-war violence, although 
studies have been made of violent phenomena such as the maras in El Salvador. This re-
port is, empirically speaking, a jigsaw puzzle, and it also treads new ground in theoretical 
terms, for, as is evident from the first hypothesis especially, in seeking the causes of the 
present violence it gets involved in a new kind of approach to the issue. The report is 
based on some 50 interviews with Salvadoran academics, politicians (including ex-
presidents), members of the police and judiciary, NGO activists, and also violent crimi-
nals. The interviews were carried out by the author in 1997, 2006 and 2007.4 
2. Empirical findings 
2.1 Levels of violence 
The average homicide rate for El Salvador in the post-war period, since 1992, comes to 
74.8. A rate of more than 10 is already classified by the World Health Organization as an 
epidemic. El Salvador has a homicide rate which is 2.5 times higher than the average for 
Latin America, which for its part has an average six times as high as the global average.5 
 
 
4 The interviews would not have been possible without the support of the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) and the remarkable cooperation of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in El Salvador, 
of the local branches of the Friedrich Ebert- and Hanns-Seidel Foundations, and also above all of the Sal-
vadoran interviewees. I would like to express my gratitude to them all here.  
5 As is customary in literature, the homicide rate is also used here as evidence for the evolution of violence, 
because it remains the most reliable of all levels of violence, well knowing that homicides always represent 
only the smaller proportion of acts of violence. The reliability and availability of homicide statistics are them-
selves extremely poor; the figure therefore had to be compiled from different data sources. Post-war rates for 
the 1990s are based on data from the World Health Organization, and for the 2000s on statistics from the 
Salvadoran police. I am aware that in comparison to the homicide rates issued by forensic scientists and the 
public prosecutor’s office those from the police are the lowest. I am using these statistics, where available, as a 
basis because the police across all Central American countries have been collecting data the most continu-
ously and they are the only institution in possession of a complete statistical picture of departments and mu-
nicipalities. However, regardless of which source is used, there is no doubt at all about the distinctive sine-
curve graph of the homicide rate as shown in Figure 1.  
4 Heidrun Zinecker 
 
 
Figure 1: Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador, 1982-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own representation, based on: Cruz/Trigueros/González 1999: 19; United Nations 2000: 35; www.proceso.com. 
mx/noticia.html?nid=29537&cat=0. (last accessed 05.08.2005); guanacos.centramerica.com (last accessed 
09.04.2007); www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/articulos.html (last accessed 05.03.2005).  
The homicide rate rose in El Salvador in the first four years after the war to double the 
level of the final wartime rates. It reached its peak at a time when political violence had 
disappeared from the scene; violence was exclusively violent crime, and the maras were 
still at an embryonic stage of development. The rate then dropped dramatically, to below 
the level of the final wartime rates, only to increase sharply again after 2003. The fact that 
the rate is rapidly increasing again, only just remaining below the level of the final war-
time rates, puts a question mark over the assumption that post-war violence is solely due 
to the understandably poor performance of the only recently established security sector 
during the years immediately after the war. Four questions therefore arise:  
1) Why is the homicide rate generally so high in the post-war period?  
2) Why did it increase so sharply in the years immediately following the end of the war?  
3) Why did it then drop for an interim period?  
4) Why has it been increasingly dramatically again since 2003?  
A comparison with the departmental statistics for Guatemala reveals that in El Salva-
dor there is not such a great difference between homicide rates in the different depart-
ments. In Guatemala (in 2005) the rate ranges from 7 (Totonicapán) to 111 homicides 
(Petén) per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas in El Salvador (in 2004) the greatest difference is 
between 10.2 (Morazán) and 52.8 (Sonsonate). However, taking a look at the municipali-
ties, the difference in El Salvador does turn out to be a considerable one too (PNUD 2005 
c: 484): between 132 (Municipio Sonsonate) and 0 (e.g. Municipio Yamabal). Further-
more, even in regions with a low level of violence the large cities, often the regional capi-
tals, are characterized by a homicide rate which is high even by the country’s own stan-
dards. On the whole, however, violence in El Salvador is more evenly distributed over the 
country’s territory than in Guatemala. It is neither the poorest departments nor those 
with the highest Gini coefficient (using both indices, these are Cabañas, San Miguel and 
Morazán), which have the highest level of violence (these are Sonsonate, La Libertad, 
Santa Ana and San Salvador). Nor yet is it the departments once worst affected by the civil 
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war, since these are precisely those which were then and are still now characterized by the 
highest levels of poverty and inequality.  
According to Medicina Legal, 57.4 % of homicides in El Salvador in 2003 were to 
blame on general crime (delincuencia común), and only 8.0 % on the maras, the youth 
gangs typical of El Salvador (PNUD 2005 a: 23). However, in March 2007 the police 
commissioner declared that 80 % of homicides were to blame on the maras. Only after 
further enquiry did he state more precisely that 80 % of all homicides were connected with 
maras, i.e. mareros could also simply be victims, going on to concede that only half of the 
perpetrators of murder and manslaughter were in fact mareros. In any event, according to 
the police commissioner, mareros represented the largest group of perpetrators, followed 
only then by general crime (Ávila 2007). Marcela Smutt, specialist on violence for the 
UNDP, is meanwhile of the opinion that only 30-40 % of homicides were to blame on the 
maras, with the rest being unsolved, but it could be assumed that the majority of violence 
was perpetrated by general criminals (Smutt 2006). In 2004, 12.8 % of citizens reported 
themselves the victims of a crime, but only 4.6 % voluntarily said that they had suffered 
abuse at the hands of the maras (FESPAD 2005: 14). Political violence nowadays is largely 
immaterial, although it has recently been on the rise again, whether as symbolic violence 
in political campaigns or as clashes in the context of elections. In any event, however, 
violence even in the form of violent crime is being manipulated for political ends.  
Although the maras are not responsible for the majority of violence, they are presented 
below as an example of perpetrators of violence, because they are currently the most rele-
vant collective perpetrators of violence in El Salvador, inasmuch as they are undergoing 
important transformations which need to be taken into account, and because the coun-
try’s entire domestic security policy is focused on them.  
2.2 Forms of violence – the example of the maras (an excursus) 
Maras6, the currently typical form for youth gangs in El Salvador, but also in Guatemala 
and Honduras, have predecessors in El Salvador who date back way before the civil war, 
some to as long ago as the 1940s. Based on gangs (barras) formed in the context of sports 
competitions, the 1970s saw the formation of student gangs (maras estudiantiles), who 
had it out with the maras from another educational institution, and street gangs (maras 
callejeras), who identified themselves by the part of town (barrio) from which they came. 
Clashes also ensued between both these kinds of gang. However, at most it was stones 
being thrown, or at very worst a knife being pulled. These gangs did not use guns. Neither 
gang had anything to do with the political conflicts before or during the war. The civil war 
drew a cover over the disputes between them, without bringing them to an end 
(Savenije/Beltrán 2005: 24).  
 
 
6 The name “mara” was already in use by the Central American youth gangs of the 1970s and 1980s. It 
comes from “con mis amigos” (with my friends), but was later traced back to “marabunta” (killer ants 
which caused immense destruction in Brazil in a 1970s film).  
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In the second half of the 1980s, while the civil war was still being waged, the first Sal-
vadoran migrants were deported back to El Salvador from the USA. They included young 
men who had belonged to the Mara Salvatrucha (MS) or Barrio 18 in Los Angeles, from 
where they brought back distinctive cultural influences and symbolism into the Salva-
doran street gangs. However, mass migration to the USA, and then the return or deporta-
tion of the migrants, did not begin until after the war had ended. Under this influence 
Salvadoran maras increasingly adopted characteristics of their Los Angeles models, al-
though never to the exclusion of all else. Culturally speaking, mareros are and will remain 
“transnational hybrids” in either of the worlds in which they live. Much earlier than those 
responsible in the Salvadoran state security sector realized, the new maras became active 
after the war. As long ago as in 1993 40 % of city-dwellers in El Salvador confirmed that 
they had noticed maras (Cruz/Carranza 2006: 133). Although the mareros deported from 
the USA continue to bring the, primarily cultural, model into the Salvadoran maras, the 
gangs carry out their recruitment even today mainly in El Salvador: some 90 % of their 
members join in their own country and not in the USA. Two thirds of these were re-
cruited in the Salvadoran penal system by mareros serving a jail sentence. Meanwhile, the 
first generation of new maras has grown older and is about to turn 40. At the same time, 
far more children are being recruited than before.  
However, even in the new maras, which reached their peak in the mid 1990s, there was 
a remarkable development: while at first they were groups who formed for the sake of the 
“crazy life” (vida loca), i.e. so as to have fun and enjoy alcohol, parties, sex and drugs 
(vacilar), the motive later on for joining the maras increasingly became primarily the ex-
ercise of power and gaining of respect – through fear (Homies Unidos et al. 1998: 71). 
After 2000 at the latest, the maras evolved into associations which employed violence spe-
cifically to further largely economic interests (Aguilar/Miranda 2006: 52) and to cooperate 
with organized crime. The maras are closely linked with drugs cartels. For the maras vio-
lence is not an end in itself, but a means of making money and raising their own status. 
This does not rule out the fact that earlier reasons for joining the maras have retained their 
appeal, including among others the motivation that the maras were frequently the only so-
cial reference group available to youngsters in their locality, or barrio (Cruz/Carranza 2006: 
142). However, the fact remains that not all gangs are maras, not all maras are part of organ-
ized crime, and not every marero commits acts of violence. Nonetheless, the desire of young 
people to gain power, respect and money by criminal means is the dark side of a society 
dominated by an oligarchy and characterized by economic, social and political exclusion. 
Nowadays in El Salvador there are between 9,500 (González, P. 2006 b: 2) and 35,000 
(Aguilar/Miranda 2006: 47) mareros, 3,500 of whom are in the penal system. The police 
have registered 309 clicas, or mara cells (Aguilar/Miranda 2006: 48). With regard to the 
number of mareros, El Salvador takes third place in Central America, behind Honduras 
and Guatemala (Carranza 2006). When one considers that the homicide rate in El Salva-
dor is some 10 to 20 points higher than in both other countries, it becomes clear that most 
of the homicides cannot be blamed on maras, even allowing for the fact that it is possible 
for one marero to have committed more than one homicide. Most mara victims belong to 
the same gang, and have been murdered for desertion or because of enemy rivalries be-
tween clicas, only then come victims from the other gang, followed by witnesses of crimi-
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nal acts, then the police and their assistants, and finally those who resist violent extortion 
(González, P. 2006 a). 
Of Salvadoran mareros, 55 % belong to the MS and 33 % to the Barrio 18, with other 
maras playing a subordinate role (Aguilar/Miranda 2006: 48). Barrio 18 is more closely 
linked with organized crime, more deeply involved in economic crime such as robbery 
and extortion, and has more resources than the MS. It is said of Barrio 18 that its mem-
bers are more fanatical, colder and more cruel when they kill. It has a more sophisticated 
hierarchical structure than the MS, which for its part is more similar to a movement. 
While Barrio 18 always had leaders (palabreros), the MS mareros insisted for years that 
they had none (Carranza 2006). This changed after the government introduced their re-
pressive anti-mara strategy in 2003. In the MS there are now leaders at all levels in the 
form of corredores, while misioneros carry out specific duties such as collecting “taxes”, 
and avesillas are responsible for the barrio. With La Cuna, also known as “the 13”, a kind 
of council of state, the MS has a clearly delineated management floor, in which a Central 
American leader is supposed to hold sway (Carlos 2006). The most senior mara leaders 
live in the USA. In their own country the veterans have the highest authority, especially 
those deported from the USA and those in custody.  
The members of the mara are systematically robbed of their personality; they are num-
bers without faces, who have a duty or a “mission” to fulfil. According to an expert with 
in-depth knowledge who would prefer to remain anonymous for security reasons, the 
maras are more fundamentalist than extreme Islamic groups, for they do not hope for any 
reward in Paradise, but are bound straight for hell. Death is their fate, and therein lies 
their only pleasure. Where others crave drugs, they crave death. This observer reports 
satanistic rituals, in which mareros eat the heart of their victims, pour blood from a corpse 
into a cup and drink it in imitation of the Eucharist. They hand the corpse over to the 
devil, by throwing it into a ditch. This makes them convinced that they have consumed 
the devil and are now strong enough and ready to commit murder (anonymous member 
of civil society 2006). Other observers, likewise from a church-going background, are 
more sceptical about this: the mareros might describe themselves as “sons of the devil”, 
but would nonetheless value priests more highly as “sons of God” (Rodríguez 2006). The 
talk of the devil, according to another person with knowledge of the maras, is in fact just 
talk. If you tell them that you do not believe in God yourself, then the mareros are shocked 
(Carlos 2006).  
Since the government’s repressive anti-mara strategy began in 2003, which included 
infiltration of the maras by police agents, maras have altered their appearance and behav-
iour. They no longer get tattoos, or wear the style of clothes that was typical of them, and 
have now developed new language codes. Their acts of violence have become more hor-
rific. Decapitation of victims has a far broader significance than before. The maras have 
strengthened their internal code of conduct. Members of Barrio 18 are no longer allowed 
to leave at all; in the MS they can become “silent” mareros (calmarse), but only under 
quite stringent conditions, which include regular reporting to the leaders. The MS has set 
up 13 new internal rules: the previous initiation rite (to fight the others for 13 seconds) 
was scrapped. From now, those seeking admission to the mara must complete a task 
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which generally amounts to murder. Police agents would be detected at this point, if not 
earlier. Women are no longer admitted into this mara. Gang members are now forbidden 
from taking drugs, with the exception of marijuana. Theft not sanctioned by the leader is 
punished. The general meetings of the clicas, the mirins (now known as misas), are now 
held only by telephone. The casas “destroyer”, or safe houses used by mareros for meetings 
and sometime also to live in, have been abandoned. Nowadays, it is mainly penal institu-
tions that are used specifically to provide structure and potential recruits to the maras. 
Violence has an even greater role to play for the maras than it did before, and is exercised 
increasingly forcefully on the civilian population as well. All these changes have made the 
maras more disciplined and flexible in the face of government strategy.  
Other than might generally be expected, mareros do not come either from the poorest 
strata of society or the most marginalized parts of town, instead they come from working 
class or lower middle class backgrounds, i.e. from sections of the population classified as 
the second and third income quintiles (from the bottom). They are not street children; 
they generally have a home, located in urban barrios with a high population density and 
most commonly in a rented house with a large number of inhabitants. Mareros are also 
not war orphans. They do not come from asocial families. Their parents have an income, 
and are often being sent remittances from family members working abroad. Mareros are 
educated to a higher level than the average Salvadoran. Mareros either left school early, or 
were unemployed or working in insecure part-time jobs before they joined the maras (Car-
ranza 2006). 75 % of mareros are unemployed. When asked what they would most like to 
have, the majority of mareros questioned replied: work (Homies Unidos 1998: 39, 113). 
3. Model 
The following causal analysis of Salvadoran post-war violence – and also, although not ex-
clusively, of the maras – adopts an aetiological sociostructural (macro-)approach as used in 
criminology. This approach is based on the hypothesis that there are “conspicuous” societal 
structures which, in certain life situations, exert a social pressure leading to deviant behav-
iour (Albrecht 2002: 31–33, 37–39). In the context of this theory I have elsewhere differenti-
ated between enabling and preventive structures (Zinecker 2006 a: 20-39). Enabling struc-
tures offer fertile ground for (violent) crime. Preventive structures can act to ensure that 
there are no outbreaks of (violent) crime even where enabling structures are present. 
Where preventive structures are absent or poorly functioning, this makes the effects of the 
enabling structures stronger. I make the claim here that, in cases of intensive violence, well 
developed enabling structures are working hand in hand with poorly functioning preven-
tive structures.  
Enabling structures can be political and economic in nature. A political enabling struc-
ture which particularly benefits violence (and not only war) is semi-democracy, which I 
describe as regime hybridity, because this term is more precise and gives a better indica-
tion that the regimes in question, while not authoritarian, are also simply not democratic. 
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Using my model, democracy encompasses the elements of civil rule, polyarchy, the rule of 
law, political inclusion and a civilized (non violent) life for its citizens, where a civilized 
life must be omitted as an independent variable when investigating the causes of violence, 
so as not to end up with a circular problem. Where the first two elements exist in a non-
democratic system, this is authoritarianism. Where the next three elements exist in a non-
democratic version, this is a non-authoritarian form of non-democracy, and therefore 
regime hybridity. Regime hybridity also arises, however, when state institutions do not 
function, or function badly, resulting in poor performance. A democracy is no democracy 
if its institutions do not function. Thus hybrid regime is understood here to be a kind of 
regime which can be assigned to the grey area between authoritarianism and democracy 
when judged by its content and/or its performance (Zinecker 2004 b: 239-272). 
Poverty, inequality or a low level of economic development are identified in relevant 
literature as economic enabling structures for violence. However, as illustrated in the in-
troduction, this is all just as inappropriate as a causal factor in El Salvador’s violent crime 
as it is for that in Guatemala and Honduras. I therefore assume that other economic ena-
bling structures can be identified in this case, specifically the rent economy. From the 
variety of rent approaches I will be using a rent model which is open both internally, pro-
viding for several different types of rent, and externally for linking to political structures. 
There is such a model in the work of Hartmut Elsenhans (Elsenhans 1994: 106-109). Fol-
lowing this model, there are in rent economies marginal labour forces who possess the 
physical prerequisites to produce more than they need for their own and their family’s 
needs, but who are unable to do so because of inadequate means of production. A weak 
economic status for labour results in the levels of real wages and mass income also being 
low, which leads to a systematic curtailment of internal market relations. This in turn 
implies that incentives for investment and innovation are low, and as a result self-
generating capitalist growth become impossible. If, instead of capital and labour, it is rents 
and restriction of labour which confront each other, resulting in there being no guarantee 
of dynamic equilibrium of supply and demand, the opportunity costs argument suggests, 
indirectly, to the lower classes in particular that they should seek out an alternative kind of 
market access, for which violence seems to offer a quick and readily available substitute.  
El Salvador and the other violent cases Guatemala and Honduras are both hybrid re-
gimes and rent economies. However, Nicaragua is also both these things, while having a 
lower level of violence. For this reason regime hybridity and rent economy are not per se 
causal factors for high levels of violence. Instead it is necessary to look for quite specific 
configurations and combinations of regime hybridity and rent economy, which are pre-
sent only in the cases of high intensity violence, in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 
but not in Nicaragua. I perceive the specific configuration of regime hybridity with the 
power to explain the high levels of violence in the cases of high intensity violence in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala to be on the one hand, with regard to the regime’s 
content, the absence of political inclusion and the absence of the rule of law, and on the 
other, with regard to the functional competence of state institutions, an extremely poor 
performance and at the same time repressive behaviour by precisely those institutions 
which constitute the security sector: the police and judiciary. As far as the absence of po-
litical inclusion is concerned, this is inherent in the oligarchic systems prevalent in Central 
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America’s most intensely violent countries, and known to represent the opposite of mass 
politics in the form of minority rule.  
I perceive the specific configuration of rent economies with the power to explain the 
high levels of violence to be the predominance of new rents, which have taken the place of 
the old (agrarian) income, so that instead of creating mechanisms for a market economy 
they set up a modern outlet for old oligarchic structures, through which the “excess pres-
sure” threatening the system can be channelled off, which otherwise would have repre-
sented a threat to the oligarchy from below. These new rents include income from stocks 
and bonds and (using a broad concept of income) the maquila (sweatshop) industry, but 
first and foremost remittances. This report will concentrate on the remittances and also 
the poor performance and repressive behaviour of the security sector, one element respec-
tively from enabling and preventive structures, because both these factors are even more 
firmly rooted in El Salvador than in both the region’s other violent cases. 
4. Reality 
4.1 Fundamental causes of violence 
4.1.1 Regime hybridity 
The right-wing government party ARENA and also relevant indicators for democracy 
consider El Salvador’s political regime to be democratic. The left-wing opposition party 
FMLN describes it on the other hand as a “civil dictatorship” (González, M. 2006). I have 
shown elsewhere that El Salvador currently has a hybrid regime, which essentially features 
the democratic elements of civil rule and polyarchy (deficiencies are not pronounced 
enough here for the basic criterion for this not to apply), while lacking the democratic 
elements of the rule of law and political inclusion (Zinecker 2004 a: 108-188; Zinecker 
2007: 1089-1100). El Salvador is under the thumb of an oligarchy that, although modern-
ized, has persisted in its nuclear form for centuries, which as a minority by definition 
automatically rules out political inclusion. In the context of Latin America the country 
also represents an extreme case of the government agenda conforming to the interests of 
the oligarchy (Segovia 2006: 550).  
This peculiarly political exclusion typical of oligarchic regimes, and the corresponding 
anti-oligarchy opposition, give rise to the bipolarity of the party system, in which ARENA 
and FMLN are diametrically opposed. The fact that both parties have almost equal follow-
ings is evident from the fact that although ARENA always provides the presidents, the 
FMLN has had more seats in parliament since 2000, without having an absolute majority, 
and has been the party of numerous mayors, including that of the capital city. While in 
Guatemala a fragmented party system that fails to attract voters can be said to be the sign of 
an absence of democracy and the cause of high levels of violence, in El Salvador paradoxi-
cally it is the two-pronged party system that does attract voters which has a similar effect.  
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The government party ARENA makes use of violence for its own political ends. The 
high income from violence enables it to justify the country’s characteristically oligarchic 
and prohibitive structure superbly well, and force the security sector’s institutions into a 
subordinate role by removing them from democratic control. Ex-President Armando 
Calderón Sol acknowledges, “We made a lot of mistakes. We made use of violent crime. 
We are very much to blame. Crime was politicized by us from a party perspective. It was a 
problem shared by us all. But even we, I mean ARENA, were involved in it. It was a poor 
approach.” (Calderón 2006) 
The FMLN on the other hand has used the maras as political backup before. But even 
Ex-President Alfredo Cristiani of ARENA does not believe the claim to be true that the 
FMLN are in command of the maras (Cristiani 2006). Nevertheless, during the last elec-
tion campaign ARENA booked a TV spot in which a member of Barrio 18 claimed that 
the MS worked for FMLN. It is certainly true that mareros actually do have a greater affin-
ity for FMLN than for ARENA, however, according to Eduardo Linares of the FMLN and 
former head of police in the capital city, it would be wrong to believe that all mareros had 
left-wing allegiances. “If that were the case, then the FMLN would have been in power 
long ago.” (Linares 2006) Although a few of the municipalities with the highest levels of 
violence are or were governed by the FMLN (Apopa, Ilopango, Soyapango, Santa Tecla), 
people should not jump to conclusions: the central government does everything in its 
power to ensure that mayors from the opposition party fail. This leads to resourcing prob-
lems in the security sector as well. Furthermore, the municipalities governed by the FMLN 
are not the wealthiest anyway. It therefore becomes clear that not only a weak (as in Gua-
temala), but also a strong party system (as in El Salvador) can generate high levels of vio-
lence, in the latter case because in the face of the relative balance of power between the 
two parties any social issue, including violence, can be manipulated in favour of respective 
party interests.  
As far as performance of state institutions is concerned, many of them, especially the 
security sector, have entirely restructured themselves in the course of the transition to 
more democracy and peace building. In doing so, they first of all became increasingly 
democratic, but functioned worse. The army, historically the state-builder, had to with-
draw from politics after the peace accords, and there was no new state-builder in sight. 
The first post-war explosion of violence coincided with this period of institutional vac-
uum, lasting until 1996 and completely overwhelming the institutions. Initially they did 
not react at all, and then they did so in a much more repressive way so as to compensate 
for their poor performance (which they could not) and put the success of the democrati-
zation process once more into question. This goes to explain the second explosion of vio-
lence after 2003. 
4.1.2 Rent economy 
Structures which cause violence can be traced back to quite specific configurations of rent 
economy, consequently to the predominance of new rents, because these reinforce the 
bipolarity between the oligarchy and the poor by creating an outlet for rent economies. In 
spite of economic liberalization, the nucleus of the old coffee-based oligarchy which 
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dominated the country for centuries continues to hold sway in El Salvador. Since the end 
of the civil war this nucleus has modernized itself, taken on a global dimension and diver-
sified its activities. Further power groups have sprung up around it, some of which are its 
economic equals. Even its own most significant income is no longer from coffee but from 
new, speculative, stocks and bonds. After the peace agreement, the most important coffee 
oligarchies concentrated their efforts in the sector of financial speculation. Later on they 
expanded their business into provision for the elderly, insurance and real estate (Segovia 
2006: 549). As it was only a few families (in particular Cristiani-Burkard-Llach-Hill, 
Mathies-Regalado-Dueñas-Baldocchi, Murray-Meza-Ayau and de Sola) who expanded 
their former business activities in the coffee monopoly into other sectors, namely the fi-
nancial sector, the Salvadoran rent-appropriating class while admittedly modernizing 
itself did not stop being an oligarchy, but merely restructured itself as a new oligarchy.  
Nevertheless El Salvador has the lowest Gini coefficient after Costa Rica and therefore 
a relatively low level of general inequality by Central American standards. This is due 
mainly to the fact that the second, third and fourth quintiles from the lowest are relatively 
well off, as illustrated in Figure 2. This is also borne out by the high level of migration by 
Hondurans and Nicaraguans to El Salvador because of the higher wages there. 
Figure 2: Income distribution by quintile in urban households, 1998/1999 
 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
El Salvador 5.6 10.7 15.7 22.5 45.6 
Guatemala 5.5 9.2 15.5 19.7 62.2 
Honduras 4.7 9.7 13.5 21.2 49.8 
Nicaragua 3.5 8.8 13.3 20.2 54.3 
Costa Rica 5.5 10.6 15.9 24.1 43.8 
Source: UNDP 2004: 129f. 
The rent-appropriating oligarchy as the top quintile implies not only marginality at the 
other end of the scale, the lowest quintile, but also has no interest in free market economy 
or the prerequisite for this, the production of capital goods. It generally invests very little 
in the production sector. Investment rates reflect this: between 1990 and 2003 in El Salva-
dor, with its high level of violence, fixed internal gross investment was 16.6 % of its GDP, 
ranking the country nine percentage points below Nicaragua, with its low level of vio-
lence, in which it was 25.6 points.7 
Under conditions where oligarchic structures systematically obstruct investments – es-
pecially in capital goods production – and therefore also local production and labour, the 
oligarchy urgently needs an outlet in order to survive. New rents fulfil this function. How-
ever, new rents for their part restrict the firm establishment of local labour and produc-
tion, which once more attracts a low level of investment. The most important new rents in 
 
 
7 cf. www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/14980/DGE-2234-Cap3.pdf (last accessed 02.05.07). 
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El Salvador are the remittances, which are income sent home to their families by migrants 
working abroad. In El Salvador in particular, remittances are hardly ever saved. Remit-
tances not only fundamentally reduce investments (Cáceres/Saca 2006: 881), but also the 
supply and, at least in the longer term, because the attraction is no longer there to create 
employment by investing locally, demand for employment in the Salvadorans own country. 
Remittances support oligarchic structures, because they make it possible to be a consumer 
without working or producing anything. In the following section I will show that in El Sal-
vador there is a causal connection between the high levels of migration and remittances – 
the exodus and its economic consequences – and high homicide rates – the “exitus”.  
4.2 Specific, highly significant causes of violence in El Salvador 
4.2.1 Migration and remittances  
In a first step I shall demonstrate the exceptionally high volume of Salvadoran migration 
to the USA. Secondly, I shall illustrate the extremely high value of remittances within the 
(socio)economic structure of El Salvador and the implication of this for the reduced im-
portance of local production and labour. A third step will confirm the particularly high 
volume of remittances in El Salvador with the corresponding economic and social impli-
cations in comparison with the rest of Central America. If this is successful, then it goes to 
prove that there is a correlation – as El Salvador is also the country with the highest levels 
of violence in the region. This correlation will then be confirmed in a fourth step using 
comparison within El Salvador itself (between the departments and municipalities). A 
fifth step will finally derive causality from these correlations.  
Step 1: The exceptionally high volume of migration by Salvadorans to the USA – 
in comparison with the rest of Central America  
In 2004 2.5 million inhabitants emigrated from El Salvador, i.e. 20 % of the population 
and almost seven times the global average, primarily to the USA and then to Mexico. This 
is a real exodus. 90 % of these migrants are younger than 35 and 70 % younger than 26. 
Viewed statistically, the Salvadoran migrants tend to be male rather than female, aged 
between 18 and 44 years old, and from rural areas, with a slightly higher standard of living 
and education than the average for those who do not migrate (Andrade-Eekhoff 2003: 
16). Neither the two top quintiles nor the bottom quintile of the population migrate, but 
instead the second and third quintiles from the lowest, who are better off in El Salvador 
than their counterparts in Honduras and Nicaragua, but worse off than those in the USA.  
In the USA the Salvadorans represented the largest number of Central American resi-
dents with 1,201,002 in 2004. This is three times as many Salvadorans as Guatemalans and 
Hondurans, and almost four times as many as Nicaraguans. 42 % of the Salvadorans who 
migrated to the USA went to California. More than two thirds of them ended up in Los 
Angeles, where the American mara street gangs had their origins. If one compares the 
number of people deported from the USA, the rate for Nicaraguans is only a tenth of that 
for Salvadorans and Hondurans, as illustrated in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3: (Deported) Central American residents in (from) the USA (2004) 
 Salvadorans Guatemalans Hondurans Nicaraguans 
Number of residents 
in the USA 
1,201,002 698,745 407,994 248,725 
Percentage of 
population 
17.77 5.64 5.68 4.62 
Central American 
residents deported 
from the USA  
56,076 39,669 63,639 50,26 
Percentage of 
population 
0.82 0.32 0.88 0.09 
Source: Rocha 2006: 47 
Step 2: The particularly high value of remittances within the (socio)economic 
structure of El Salvador and its implications for the loss of importance 
of local production and labour  
Salvadoran emigrants send remittances to 22 % of households in El Salvador. Of these, 
40 % of households are supported by their relations with migrants. It is particularly inter-
esting to observe the transformation of the value of remittances within foreign currency 
inflow.8 In Figure 4, each section of both bars which represents the remittances is filled in 
black; the difference in length to the other sections of bars in 2004, but also to the same 
section in 1978, is enormous: 
Figure 4: Transformation in foreign currency inflow to El Salvador in % 
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Source: PNUD 2005 c: 7. 
The figure illustrates that in Salvadoran foreign trade between 1978, when the homi-
cide rate was still relatively low, and 2004, by which time it was high, a complete turn-
around has taken place in the relation between traditional agrarian export and remit-
tances. With remittances, 70 % of foreign currency inflow is now acquired abroad. If you 
include the 12 % of the maquila, which is local with regard to labour, but not to capital, 
then 82 % of foreign currency inflow does not come from the combination of local labour 
 
 
8 Foreign currency inflow comes from net export, direct investments, portfolio investments, development aid 
and loans. Debt service must be subtracted. Not all foreign currency inflow is therefore rents.  
From Exodus to Exitus 15
 
 
and local investment. In El Salvador, this transformation in the structure of foreign cur-
rency and surplus, which is highly radical and counterproductive for rejecting rent econ-
omy and establishing market economy, can be equated in terms of its size with the time 
the country embarked upon coffee export and then upon import substitution industriali-
zation, the failure of which was one cause of the civil war.   
Not only has the economy of El Salvador not been an agro-export economy since the 
end of the war at the latest, as illustrated in the above diagram, but it has also no longer 
been an export economy in general, as it hardly produces any industrial goods for export. 
It always served almost exclusively foreign economic systems. Now however it fulfils the 
same function, by making labour available to foreign economic systems – whether via 
remittances or maquila – as a factor of production, rather than export goods (Montecino 
2006: 838). In this, maquila plays a secondary role to remittances. However, if the maquila 
did not exist, having represented almost half export volume since 1997, El Salvador’s ex-
port rates would drop. The maquila is also where presocialization of future migrants and 
remittance-earners takes place (Puerta 2007). 
The influx of substantial volumes of remittances leads to an increase in value of the ex-
change rate and therefore also to a specific manifestation of the Dutch Disease9, the remit-
tances disease, which diminishes the opportunities for export and causes imports to rise: 
in 2005 42 % of imports in El Salvador were funded by remittances (Equipo 2006: 30). 
Remittances make consumption possible in the home country, without this being sup-
ported by remuneration of local labour. 83 % of remittances in El Salvador are spent on 
consumption, in particular to buy food (Equipo 2006: 27). Remittances certainly lead to 
increased demand, but not (at least, not in El Salvador) to an increase in local production. 
Only about 6 % of remittances are saved in El Salvador, which does not even mean that 
these savings are invested. Moreover, many migrants save in their countries of residence. 
The demand artificially created by remittances is not conferred onto local production but 
onto imports, as is usually the case with Dutch Disease. Remittances therefore fund im-
ports and reduce the incentives for local production. Less is produced and employment 
opportunities also decline. If foodstuffs are also imported, this has a serious effect on local 
food production and opportunities for employment in the agricultural sector. This in turn 
causes migration into the cities and urbanization. Urbanization causes the population 
density in housing to increase considerably. Families living with 10 people in an area of 
30 sq m find it hard to cope. The children flee from the lack of space onto the streets, 
where the maras are waiting for them. 
Remittances are the consequence of economically motivated migration, and conse-
quently are linked with a lack of demand for labour in the home country. Migration en-
sues either because of anticipated higher wages in the other location (in the case of quali-
fied workers) or because of existing unemployment in the country of origin (in the case of 
less well qualified workers). Not only the second, but also the first motivation is indebted 
 
 
9 Dutch disease can manifest itself if new resources suddenly open up. The currency appreciation that this 
causes brings with it sales problems for export industries. Decreased export of these goods leads to the de-
cline or disappearance of the industry in question.  
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to the geographical difference between supply of and demand for work. Labour migrates if 
it is undervalued in its own country, or if there is absolutely no demand for it. A low re-
muneration of labour is typical of oligarchic structures, in which there is hardly any com-
petition. El Salvador is a classic example of an oligarchic structure. Since migration is as a 
rule linked to the motivation of wanting to send remittances to one’s own family, migra-
tion and remittances mutually reinforce each other’s effect.  
If one compares the average remittance amount received monthly by each Salvadoran 
household (USD 157) with the minimum wage in El Salvador in rural areas (USD 83), the 
ratio is almost 2 to 1. On the other hand, wages in El Salvador are higher than in Nicara-
gua, Honduras and Guatemala, and in contrast to the other countries the Salvadoran cur-
rency has furthermore been converted to the US dollar. This has resulted in an influx of 
Honduran and Nicaraguan workers into El Salvador, in greater numbers than the flow of 
Salvadoran workers abroad. As a result there is a surplus of workers, which has in turn 
reduced the level of Salvadoran wages, but not the number of local workers migrating to 
the USA because it is not worth their while to emigrate to neighbouring Central American 
countries, in view of the inverse pay differential.  
Remittances deprive the Salvadoran economy of labour. On the one hand, 67 % of 
men and 66 % of women migrating from El Salvador are doing so because they want to 
find work (Equipo 2006: 11). On the other hand, remittances reduce the necessity and 
desire of those families who receive them to find work themselves. This is because people 
from households with remittances have higher earning expectations than people from 
households without remittances and consequently will not accept any work (they do not 
have to). Unemployment in households with remittances comes to 8.6 %, and in house-
holds without remittances 6.4 %. Those departments (La Union, Cabañas and Morazán) 
which receive the most remittances have the lowest proportion of economically active 
inhabitants who are of working age (PNUD 2005 c: 89 – 92). As they are barely invested in 
education and still less in production, remittances are unable to absorb labour, but in-
stead are able to evacuate it – and that only partially. All this reduces the production ca-
pacity and structure of the country despatching the labour.  
At 6.8 % of the economically active population (2004), the official unemployment rate 
in El Salvador is actually relatively low thanks to remittances, or rather to the exceptional 
rate of migration abroad which underlies them which removes 400,000 people (i.e. 7.5 % 
of the economically active population) from Salvadoran unemployment statistics. How-
ever, if one considers that the Federal Republic of Germany has an unemployment rate of 
10 %, this reveals how little credibility can be attached to Salvadoran statistics. Of much 
more interest is the fact that El Salvador’s population tops the list of all Latin American 
countries when it comes to people’s fear of unemployment (Informe Latinobarómetro 
2005: 64). El Salvador is also the country in Latin America where the population’s fear of 
unemployment and fear of crime balance each other out most (Informe Latinobarómetro 
2005: 70). With 42.8 % of the economically active population El Salvador additionally has 
the largest informal economy (a form of concealed unemployment) in Central America. 
Since a large proportion of criminals is young, the unemployment rate for young people 
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proves to be especially relevant; even according to official statistics it is twice as high as the 
average in the rest of the population.  
Thus the enormous value of remittances to the economic structure of El Salvador has 
been shown from its percentage share of foreign currency inflow, export volumes and 
GDP. Remittances create advantages because they make consumption possible. But this is 
consumption on tick, because remittances mean consumption without (local) produc-
tion, imports without exports, and wage losses and loss of importance of labour. Remit-
tance influx and growth of GDP are inversely related to one another, because the loss of 
human capital – the main source of economic development – through emigration leads to 
recessive consequences. This is confirmed by the fact that the nominal GDP growth rate 
has been falling in El Salvador since 1995, while the remittance rate has simultaneously 
been increasing. Experts on violence have discovered that there is a correlation between 
falling economic growth rates and increasing crime (Fajnzilber et al. 2000: 219-302). If 
there is a correlation between increasing remittances and falling/stagnating GDP, as well 
as between high/increasing GDP and low/falling homicide rates, then there is also a corre-
lation between increasing remittances and increasing homicide rates (Cáceres 2006: 602).  
Step 3: The exceptional value of Salvadoran remittances in a Central American 
comparative context and the correlation of rates of remittances and 
violence on the isthmus 
Figure 5 illustrates that since the beginning of post-war violent crime in 1992 the annual 
remittance inflow is not only steadily increasing, as was already the case during the war, 
but that its growth rate has a particularly steep gradient. It is therefore possible to identify 
a correlation between the fundamentally high homicide rates and the remittance rates, 
which are high and which also increased sharply at the time the post-war period began. 
While this demonstrates a correlation with the generally high factor of the post-war homi-
cide rate, it does not yet explain its sine-curve progression. For this explanation, the rele-
vant factors are expounded in Chapter 4.2.2. 
Figure 5: Annual remittance transfers to El Salvador, in billions of US dollars 
 
Source: Orozco 2004 b: 4. 
In Latin and Central America it is El Salvador where remittances make up the largest 
proportion of export volume at 54.6 %. In second place in Central America, but with 20 
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public and in Nicaragua do remittances represent a higher percentage than in El Salvador 
(PNUD 2005 c: 137). In this respect, El Salvador with 16.1 % is ahead of Guatemala with 
10 %. In 1989 it was still 4 % (Andrade Eekhoff 2003: 18). In Nicaragua the percentage of 
GDP represented by remittances is a little higher than in El Salvador at 17.8 %. 
However, unlike Salvadoran remittances, a third of Nicaraguan remittances comes 
from Costa Rica and therefore not from the USA. In El Salvador, in contrast, 90 % of re-
mittances come from the USA. With 361 dollars per capita distribution of remittances 
(2003) El Salvador takes first place unchallenged in Central America. With 147 dollars, 
Nicaragua ranks only third place (Orozco 2004 a: 5, 7). In the annual distribution of re-
mittances per recipient household Salvadoran households receive USD 2,300, almost 
double the USD 1,170 received by Nicaraguan households (Informe del Diálogo 2004: 7). 
Finally, with regard to the contribution of remittances to volume of foreign investments 
and also to volume of official development aid, in El Salvador this is more than double 
(investments) or 60 times (development aid) as high as in Nicaragua (Agunias 2006). This 
could also explain the far higher investment rate in Nicaragua. From this it can be de-
duced that in Nicaragua the same amount of remittances, which experience shows are not 
invested, are accompanied by a far higher influx of those funds which are always, or at 
least often, invested. The picture thus corrected no longer stands at odds with the low 
levels of violence, quite apart from the fact that El Salvador according to all other remit-
tance-indicators is top of the league in any case in Central America and way in front of 
Nicaragua. At the end of the day, relevant to any explanation of the different levels of vio-
lence in El Salvador and Nicaragua is the fact that a far lower proportion of remittances in 
Nicaragua come from the USA, which is linked with a far lower rate of migration to the 
USA by Nicaraguans than by Salvadorans. This in turn has repercussions on the lower or 
higher influence of American socialization to violence on Nicaraguans and Salvadorans.   
With regard to the value of remittances in the overall economic structure, I have 
shown that El Salvador is ahead of every country in Central America even – this is espe-
cially important for the argument put forward here – up to and including the contribu-
tion to the GDP, and in particular a long way ahead in every respect of Nicaragua with its 
low level of violence. Crucial to the explanation of violence are the per capita and per 
household figures, however, where El Salvador is way in front of Nicaragua, and less so 
the contribution of remittances to GDP, the importance of which in the case of Nicaragua is 
in any event compensated by foreign investments. This was demonstrated in the context of 
the fundamentally high homicide rate after the war being accompanied by a high, indeed 
sharply increasing, growth rate in remittances. This goes to prove the correlation between 
higher remittance rate and higher levels of violence in the Central American context. 
Step 4: The correlation between high remittance rates and high levels of violence 
in an internal Salvadoran context 
Households in the departments of El Salvador which have relatively low levels of violence 
do receive comparatively large sums in remittances, but as far as the households in the 
more densely populated municipalities are concerned, these receive large sums in remit-
tances independently of whether they are located in departments with a high or a low level 
of violence, and they are at the same time areas where violence is intensive. Among the 
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departments with intensive levels of violence, San Salvador with 19,511 and Santa Ana 
with 14,840 households head the league for remittances. A huge number of households 
also receive remittances in Soyapango (19,332), after San Salvador the city with the most 
homicides. San Salvador, Soyapango and Santa Ana are top of the league both in terms of 
number of households receiving remittances and also of the monthly remittance-rate per 
person. At the same time they occupy the first three places in the homicide rate statistics. 
Sonsonate municipality, which heads the list of statistics on violence, has a similarly high 
remittance contribution per capita to San Salvador, Soyapango and Santa Ana, which are 
behind it in the statistics on violence (PNUD 2005 b: 175-178). 
While this does not mean that there is a correlation between high rates of remittances 
and levels of violence in the departments, there probably is one in the municipalities, with 
their denser populations and urban character. The positive correlation between the mu-
nicipalities is therefore more significant than the negative one between the departments, 
because violence is especially rooted in the more densely populated urban centres.  
Step 5: The causal relation between the highest rates of remittances and 
levels of violence using the example of El Salvador  
Hypothesis 1: Remittances lead to high levels of violence as, by channelling off “excess pressure” 
which poses a threat to the system, they create a new kind of outlet for inherited oligarchic struc-
tures, which basically promote violence. 
Remittances are an outlet for oligarchic structures, because they allow the oligarchy and 
its system some stability by releasing the “excess pressure” of the dangers (unemployment 
and poverty) which otherwise might put those structures at risk, so that the oligarchy does 
not have to give up its own aspirations in terms of rents and power in favour of establish-
ing a market economy. With the remittances as new rent, the oligarchy wins a substitute 
for the no longer lucrative agricultural rent, which furthermore ties in really well with its 
own new rent from (speculatively invested) stocks and bonds, especially as the remit-
tances are as a rule sent back to the home country via branches of Salvadoran banks in the 
USA, which are owned by the Salvadoran oligarchy. Maquila along with banks and trade 
are those sectors which are boosted in a special way by tax subsidies from the (oligarchic) 
state and were therefore able to achieve the highest medium growth between 1990 and 2004 
(PNUD 2005 c: 140). Remittances not only link up perfectly with income from stocks and 
bonds, but as an outlet they also enabled the old oligarchy to become a new oligarchy, and 
made possible El Salvador’s leap from being an agro-export economy to a financial and 
service-providing society – with a speculative instead of a productive economy.  
Rather than increasing, remittances reduce poverty and inequality, the latter at least in 
the form it is measured by the Gini coefficient, because they make consumption possible. 
This is also the case in El Salvador. If there had been no remittances in 2004, poverty 
would have been 7 % higher than it actually was. In the other Central American countries, 
remittances have far less potential for reducing poverty. Without remittances the Gini 
coefficient would also have been some 0.04 % higher in El Salvador. This carries with it a 
legitimating advantage for the oligarchy: the migrants do not appear in the home country’s 
statistics for unemployment, or those for poverty, illiteracy and malnourishment. If as a rule 
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it is people with considerable initiative and single-mindedness who migrate – it is often 
those who are leading figures in the comunidades – then this too favours the stability of the 
oligarchic system, even if it is also bad news for the social capital of the comunidades. 
It is not the poorest people who migrate abroad; they would not be able to raise the 
USD 5,000-10,000 that they need for the unofficial guides who lead them across the bor-
ders (coyotes): one across the Mexican border and one across the border to the USA. In 
countries with a particularly high poverty rate the poor are too poor to be able to afford 
the cost of migration, especially to the USA. Despite the high costs incurred by each mi-
gration, it is above all the second and third quintiles from the bottom that migrate to the 
USA, although in comparison to their counterparts in Central America (except in Costa 
Rica) they are relatively well off. Honduran migration specialist Ricardo Puerta assumes 
that first of all it is the lower middle class, once upwardly mobile but whose ascent has 
been brought to a halt, which is migrating to the USA (Puerta 2007).  
Remittances therefore act as an outlet for oligarchic structures, as they reduce poverty, 
general inequality and unemployment, by taking them elsewhere. Remittances help to 
legitimize oligarchic structures, by ensuring that the channelling of discontent otherwise 
present in precarious distribution ratios among the lower classes especially, who might 
call the ruling oligarchy and rent acquisition into question, does not manifest itself. 
Thanks to remittances the oligarchy can dispense with the risk, which would be entailed 
by rejecting the rent economy and turning towards a market economy.  
Hypothesis 2: Remittances lead to violence, by creating economic structures which suggest 
violence for reasons of deprivation or frustration as a way of accessing the market to those who 
do not receive remittances.  
Even if Salvadorans get work in El Salvador, it is not worth it for them in view of the radi-
cal drop in wages in their own country and the lucrative alternatives offered in the USA. If 
working at home is no longer worth it, and those affected are “wealthy” enough to mi-
grate and find work abroad, then this alternative is a lucrative one for them. If on the con-
trary they are too poor to migrate, or if they cannot spare enough to meet the other costs 
associated with migration, or if they are deported home from the country to which they 
were headed, and can then no longer find any work there, they feel themselves compelled 
to choose another alternative. Those who receive remittances can afford to buy a designer 
T-shirt, but the poor have to make do with an ordinary one. Those who receive remit-
tances can afford a pick-up truck, and the poor only a horse. This causes frustration. 
Those frustrated in this way look for a substitute for accessing the market, to replace or 
complement working at home or abroad. Violence steps forward. Not without reason is 
violence in El Salvador increasingly to be blamed on economic interests. Maras offer an 
economically better life, not only in the USA, but also in the home country. In this way 
young people who remain in El Salvador can, as long as they are mara members, compete 
with their emigré friends, or with friends at home who do receive remittances, as far as 
standard of living is concerned, even if they do not receive any remittances themselves. 
Since 1989 wages in El Salvador have fallen drastically: the medium real wages by more 
than 12 % and the minimum wages by almost 17 % (PNUD 2005 c: 13, 26). In the USA 
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Salvadorans earn more than six times as much as their fellow countrymen in El Salvador. 
With regard to the Human Development Index, Salvadoran migrants in the USA rank 
about 24 places ahead in comparison to their compatriots in El Salvador (PNUD 2005 c: 
93). If they are deported, those returning home experience frustration and deprivation, 
which leads to their no longer wanting to start from where they left off and seeking – vio-
lent – alternatives to enable them to achieve the same living standards as they did while in 
the USA.  
El Salvador is a classic example of how relative deprivation at a comparatively low 
level, i.e. without there being any great difference from the deprived individual’s sur-
roundings, can happen and bring about the same consequences as absolute or relative 
deprivation on a high level – among other things, violence. Consumer choice and expecta-
tions are extremely high in El Salvador because of the value of remittances, however the 
opportunity for everyone to satisfy these, especially for young people, is comparatively 
limited, with the result that crime, including violence, is perceived to be the only chance 
of meeting expectations and standards set by other people.  
In addition to the bipolarity between the highest and lowest quintiles, which can pro-
voke political discontent, but which does not do so in El Salvador, because the civil war, 
having broken out on this basis and failed in its objective, left only weariness in its wake, 
there are in El Salvador remarkable differences in income and consumption within and 
between the second and third quintiles from the bottom. It is not so much the economic 
cost-benefit calculation per se which encourages violence in El Salvador. Instead, relative 
to the surroundings – to the related and well-documented migrations to the USA and also 
to those returning home from their own or the next higher quintile – it is the real or at 
least perceived low standard of living, which arouses strong senses of deprivation and 
frustration similar to those aroused by poverty or great inequality. Unlike absolute depri-
vation and even unlike relative deprivation at a high level, relative deprivation at a low 
level – although it does not cause any less frustration – cannot be politically channelled 
and therefore vents itself in violent crime. 
Hypothesis 3: Migration and remittances lead to violence, by generating and sustaining a 
social void in their immediate context in the countries sending and receiving people and 
funds, which on the one hand destroys social capital and causes anomie, and on the other 
hand creates the need for new social capital and structure. However the new social capital is 
ungovernable, because it is linked with a violence which can only provide itself with a partial 
structure and otherwise generates anomic violence. 
The migration of the social context, and the possibility continually explored by Salva-
dorans of migrating themselves, destroys social networks and leads to a social void, which 
paradoxically manifests itself in the densely populated urban centres themselves. The ma-
jority of Salvadorans feel themselves abandoned by relatives and friends, and uprooted by 
their own or other people’s migration. They are always “in transit”, with the feeling that 
they may have to move on again tomorrow. This reduces any sense of belonging to a na-
tion or a community or any community spirit, especially since it is precisely the individu-
als with leadership skills who leave the comunidades. Salvadorans therefore are under the 
impression that they have no nation (González, L. 2006). As a result those affected seek a 
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place in the maras, which are not “empty” and where “people look after them”, and where 
they can join up with social networks of their own. By doing this they see themselves as be-
ing no longer outsiders, but at the heart of society. As an alternative to social void and ano-
mie, maras offer not only income or status, but also structure, although for their part they 
can only continue to exist in an anomic society and are only able to impose order on ano-
mie within limits, i.e. only in their immediate context, by setting up orders of violence there.  
However, migration also leads to the disintegration or dysfunction of the families left 
behind in the home country, increasing the likelihood that children and young people left 
behind will resort to violence. The Salvadoran children and young people who migrate to 
the USA with their parents experience other reasons for family disintegration or dysfunc-
tion of this kind: their parents are working so hard and are frequently so overwhelmed by 
the new living conditions that they have neither the time nor the energy for their children, 
who seek refuge among people of like mind and age in the American maras. Although 
remittances flow, there is little trust between the sending and receiving parties, as docu-
mented by sociological studies (Puerta 2007). Men (more often than women) frequently 
enter into new relationships in the new country and send their remittances home, as a way 
of clearing their conscience. Those who migrate to the USA and stay there illegally, having 
neither residence permit nor visa, and therefore having no legally recoverable employ-
ment or other rights, are on the one hand themselves criminal (as they are illegal) and on 
the other (because unprotected by the law) themselves quickly fall victims to crime. This 
experience socializes the mareros-to-be and becomes more entrenched in the maras, 
where the young people affected seek refuge. If they are deported from the USA because of 
illegal residency or other illegal activities, they are often already socialized as criminals. 
Finally, for young people especially, there are two migrations: one to the USA and one to 
the maras, sometimes both concurrently. Mareros also send remittances home from the 
USA. As far as the mareros in El Salvador are concerned, they find their remittances even if 
they or their families do not receive remittances: in the criminal activities of the maras. 
Not by chance does the UNDP view the maras as an independent “social and cultural 
remittance” (PNUD 2005 c: 372). 
The connection between remittances and violence is therefore complex: viewed in 
terms of long-term structure, remittances act as an outlet for oligarchic and marginal 
structures, because remittances relieve the oligarchy of its duty to support local labour 
and production of capital goods. By doing that it would generally get rid of itself or the 
rent economy, i.e. precisely those structures which are inherently more conducive to vio-
lence that market economy would be. In the shorter term remittances imply 1) a new 
relative deprivation at a low level, arousing envy and frustration, which encourages those 
affected to resort to violence as a substitute for market access, 2) the destruction of exist-
ing (violence-limiting) social networks, and 3) the socialization of migrants in the corre-
sponding violent environments in the USA. 
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4.2.2 Poor performance and repressive behaviour by the security sector 
4.2.2.1 Strategies 
Post-war Salvadoran security policy is characterized by three strategic phases, which do not 
coincide with individual presidencies: 1) the phase of transition to a more democratic re-
gime and revival of the security sector by putting new or revived institutions into action, 
without the problem of violence having been recognized as such (1992-1996), 2) the transi-
tion phase, in which the violence issue is addressed with a partial institutional reform and 
centralization of security policy, and with reforms and counter-reforms in penal legislation, 
and the ground is laid for a repressive security policy (1996-2003), and 3) the phase of re-
pressive security policy in the form of (súper) mano dura ((super) heavy hand), which has 
been replaced with elements of a socially preventive mano amiga (helping hand) and a rein-
tegrative mano extendida (outstretched hand) policy (after 2003). 
Phase 1 
The paradox of this phase, which began under President Alfredo Cristiani and ended un-
der his successor Armando Calderón Sol, and which still classifies as peace building, was 
that on the one hand a great deal had been done as part of implementing the peace accord 
to establish a new security sector, and on the other hand real developments in precisely 
the policy field on which its policy focuses had been completely ignored. The peace talks 
made provision for post-war violence, if at all, as merely a problem to do with ex-
combatants and their inadequate integration into civilian life (Cristiani 2006; Calderón 
2006), but not as a phenomenon which might apply to perpetrators who already belonged 
to a new generation and who also had no relation to or anything at all to do with ex-
combatants. Nevertheless, the acts of violence perpetrated during this phase were actually 
also political in nature and originated from ex-combatants on both sides or from new 
death squads, or else they were blamed on the usual disagreements within families or be-
tween neighbours. However, those responsible overlooked the fact that the transition 
from political violence to violent crime, already with some protagonists among the maras, 
was underway significantly even as early as during this phase.  
There was no program for public security, according to former President Cristiani, ei-
ther under his presidency or that of his successor Calderón (Cristiani 2006). The eco-
nomic and political élite was at that time solely interested in bringing the abductions, 
which affected them, to an end. To this end they lent their support to a special police unit, 
which went on to stop the abductions. The following anecdote goes to show how violent 
crime continues to be ignored as an overall structural phenomenon: in 1997, when violent 
crime had just reached its peak, the author received this response from the then security 
minister: “Violence? There is no violence here. If you are looking for violence, go to Gua-
temala” (Barrera 1997).  
Nonetheless, there were successes to report during this phase, although only early on: 
firstly, in El Salvador, national defence (abroad) was differentiated from public security 
(domestic). The old national police force, formerly under the orders of the ministry of 
defence, was replaced by a new civilian national police, controlled by the ministry for 
public security, which was to comprise 20 % FMLN revolutionaries, 20 % members of the 
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old police force, and 60 % independent police officers. This was a unique achievement, at 
least in Latin America to date. The Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (ANSP) was 
founded, which candidates for the new police force had to attend. However, demobiliza-
tion of the old police force and other security bodies created a security vacuum while the 
new ones were not yet established. It was not until one year and two months after the 
peace accords that the new police force began operating in the first department (Cha-
latenango). 
Unlike the police, the judiciary did not play a significant role in the transition. The fu-
sion of the three powers and politicization of the judiciary persisted after the peace accord 
as well. However the peace negotiations and constitutional reforms of 1991-92 reinforced 
the independence of the judiciary, even though the latter underwent less reform during 
the transition process than the army and the police (Díaz 1995: 138). 
Phase 2 
This transition phase began under the presidency of Calderón Sol and ended under Presi-
dent Francisco Flores. The institutions of the new security sector were now essentially in 
place, and the immediate violent (political) after-pains of the war had come to an end. 
Consequently, the level of violence fell, also because the partial and repressive institutional 
reform and centralization of security policy along with the counter-reforms in penal legis-
lation, which were the response to the continuing problem of violence, which although 
considerably lower was still at quite a high level, had just got underway, and so had not yet 
wrought their devastating effect.  
The phase was heralded by the adoption of the Ley Transitoria de Emergencia contra la 
Delincuencia law on 19 March 1996. The law had a period of application lasting two years 
and served to introduce an unconstitutional state of emergency. At the same time, new 
laws were brought in, under which the sentence customary up until then for such offences 
was increased by a third, or even two thirds for members of the police force. Young peo-
ple aged between 14 and 18 years were supposed to receive sentences which might extend 
for up to a seven-year prison sentence. This amounted to an abuse of the UN Convention 
for the Rights of Children. In 1997 reforms were adopted for the modification of Article 
24 of the constitution, which curtailed citizens’ privacy. Letters could now be read by state 
employees, and telephones could be bugged. In 1998 a new penal legislation was adopted. 
It already demonstrated a strong tendency to apply laws that were originally designed with 
organized crime in mind to normal delinquency (Martínez Ventura 2005: 358f.). Under-
cover investigators, house searches, and arrests without judicial orders, along with the 
seizure of property, were now legally permitted. Since 2001, the year of the contrareforma, 
there has been a further tightening of criminal justice and the code of criminal procedure 
is beginning to make itself felt. The maximum sentence was raised to 75 years, and provi-
sional arrests became the rule rather than the exception, counter to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. This was quite apart from the fact that illegal arrests under the 
false accusation of opposing the authority of the state became the order of the day, so as to 
meet quotas. 
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In 1996, when the UN mission for verifying the Peace Accords ended, the Consejo Na-
cional de Seguridad Pública was founded as a replacement for it in the field of domestic 
security. Initially, this council was under the command of the security minister, Hugo 
Barrera. At that time, the council was considered to be a mediating authority between 
ARENA and FMLN. With Salvador Samayoa, who later became its president, and David 
Escobar Galindo it was home to two “fathers” of the peace accord, who had each espoused 
differing sides during the civil war. In 1999, under President Francisco Flores, the Consejo 
was given the role of counselling body to the president with regard to security issues and 
was commissioned to develop preventive strategies (Bonilla 2006). The council president 
had cabinet status. However it was not until 2002, when the Consejo was allocated to the 
newly founded Ministerio de Gobernación, that it actually began to operate.  
President Flores had, not least because his candidacy was a result of the crisis in 
ARENA (Calderón 2006), declared from the beginning of his term in office onwards that 
public security was a priority as a way out of this crisis. He proceeded along a more 
strongly problem-orientated course than his predecessor, which was however put into 
action in a technocratic and unsustained way – i.e., without announcing the elimination 
of structural causes of violence. With the formation of the Ministerio de Gobernación in 
2001, which bundled together all the security institutions into one, a mega-ministry was 
created and security policy completely centralized. This has in the mean time been re-
versed: since December 2006 there has once again been an independent Ministerio de 
Seguridad Pública y Justicia. This is a reaction to the massive increase in levels of violence. 
Phase 3  
In July 2003, while still under President Flores, the mano dura strategy was introduced, 
initially mainly as an election campaign theme; not for nothing was the interior minister 
vice-president for ideology in ARENA and at the same time director of their election 
campaign. According to Ex-President Cristiani, this was what the population wanted: the 
maras were to be stamped out, even if this meant killing the mareros (Cristiani 2006). The 
corresponding Ley Antimara10 was adopted by parliament in October 2003, but with a 
period of application of only 180 days, and on 1 April 2004 it was officially declared un-
constitutional. On the same day it was replaced by the Ley para el Combate de Actividades 
Delincuenciales de Grupos o Asociaciones Ilícitas Especiales, which for its part remained 
applicable for three months before being likewise declared unconstitutional.  
The premises of the mano dura strategy and special laws were that the majority of the 
violence was perpetrated by the maras. However, these premises were false. The argument 
that simply being a member of the maras was criminal, because these were associations set 
up expressly for the purpose of committing crimes, rendered every marero a criminal in 
name at least, regardless of whether he had committed murder, rape or robbery. Further-
more no checks were made to see if the group of youths in question really was an associa-
tion which fulfilled the criteria for being a criminal organization. What is more, external 
characteristics such as tattoos, graffiti or sign language were sufficient alone to identify an 
 
 
10 The Ley Antimara was supposed to be applicable to all persons over the age of 12. 
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individual as a marero and so criminalize them. However, the deaf also use sign language, 
and rockers also wear tattoos.  
The mano dura plan had at least four advantages for the government: 1) a scapegoat 
had been found in the shape of the maras, a universal perpetrator of violence, easily rec-
ognizable and easy to combat severely without going into the causes of the violence. Re-
peated attempts to claim connections between the maras and al-Qaeda, which “threatened 
world peace” (Vilanova Chica 2006) were intended to paint a picture of the maras as the 
Central American counterpart to Islamic terrorists. This attempt was gratefully seized 
upon by some American military strategists and politicians. 2) After the former FMLN 
revolutionaries had been integrated into civilian life, there were now “new guerrilleros”, 
whom government supporters seemed to think they could accuse of being the political 
reserve of the FMLN. As the definition of “illegal group” was not based on any clear crite-
ria, and since the threat of terrorism undermining national security was universally and 
continually suspected to be present, social protests in the street could now be labelled as 
criminal. 3) The public insecurity stirred up in this way resulted, according to the Human 
Rights Ombudswoman (Alamanni de Carrillo 2007), in fearful people who kept quiet – 
just right for a system whose stability was shaky. This was useful for the ARENA leader-
ship. 4) The topic of the maras proved outstandingly relevant as an election campaign 
theme, not only on the occasion when the president drove tanks into Colonia Monserrat 
especially for the media.  
President Antonio Saca, in office since 2004, is caught between two camps: on the one 
hand in view of international criticism he had to give way on Flores’ anti-mara law which 
contravened human rights, and on the other he wanted to make his mark by successfully 
fighting violence. The solution he adopted was the súper mano dura strategy, which was 
supposed to include a puño de hierro (iron fist) as well as a mano amiga and a mano exten-
dida. The strategy was unveiled at the end of August 2004. A new law for the battle against 
maras was not considered to be necessary, reforms of existing laws were considered to be 
adequate. The mano amiga implied social measures to prevent violence, that is for young 
people who although resident in risky barrios were not yet perpetrators of violence. The 
mano extendida was designed for those young people who were already gang members 
and who wanted to be reintegrated into society. As even a leading ARENA founding 
member, who prefers to remain anonymous, explained the súper mano dura carried far 
more weight than the mano amiga or extendida. This must have been interpreted as 
provocation by the maras. However, provocation was the worst thing that you could do 
(ARENA, anonymous 2006). With the mano amiga and mano extendida strategies, Saca 
was moving away from the exclusively repressive strategy typical of Flores. At the same 
time, he sold his strategy to the media more effectively.  
The police and the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública were subsequently given 
four guidelines for domestic security: correction, prevention (these are the two tasks of 
the police and penal system), rehabilitation and reintegration (these are the two tasks of 
the Consejo). The last three points were new. The first point on the other hand was al-
ready a component part of the old mano dura strategy, but under the new plan it was de-
signed to be even more repressive, hence súper duro, but at the same time more rigidly 
From Exodus to Exitus 27
 
 
specified: membership of a mara as an illegal association continued to be of consequence 
from the point of view of criminal law. However, external characteristics such as tattoos 
or graffiti were no longer supposed to be enough for an individual to be arrested as a sus-
pected marero. Arrests were no longer made in such great numbers as before, but more 
selectively. The battle against the maras was more strongly institutionalized, among other 
things with the establishment of the Grupos de Tarea Anti-Pandilla (GTA), composed of 
four soldiers and one police officer and therefore operating independently, so that fre-
quently not even the police chief of the municipios knows anything about their activities. 
The police also now have the authority to enter mara “destroyer” houses or mirins with-
out a search warrant and arrest mareros there without their having harmed anybody or 
damaged anything.  
Critics (including first and foremost judges) find fault (justifiably) with the fact that 
police investigations are unsatisfactory because the police do not furnish enough evidence 
and take perpetrators into custody on spec, which is not permitted under the principles of 
law and order. The police complain (just as justifiably) that they, from the legal point of 
view, are not allowed to start any investigations at all on their own initiative, because these 
or the instruction to do them are the duty of the public prosecutor, but this does not hap-
pen. The police claim that they investigate cases in any case, to be of assistance to the pub-
lic prosecutor. If they have to release a suspect after 72 hours, because there has been no 
instruction issued by the public prosecutor, this creates the impression of crime going 
unpunished. They say that judges are not worried by this, they let criminals walk free and 
fail to uphold the law because they are afraid (Ávila 2007). For their part the judges (justi-
fiably) point to the fact that it is not their duty to carry out investigations and that they 
should order someone to be imprisoned only if there is sufficient relevant and legally ac-
ceptable evidence (Ortíz Ruíz 2006). In the absence of evidence they let both innocent and 
guilty people go free – and this they are obliged to do, in the eyes of the law. These re-
leased individuals include mareros, who go on to use their experiences to make themselves 
and their operations even more secretive (Linares 2006). 
In March 2007 the Ley del Crimen Organizado was finally passed. This made the súper 
mano dura strategy even more strict. Maras are now perceived to be part of organized 
crime, not simply an instrument of it. They remain an illegal organization in the eyes of 
the law. Organized crime is liable for up to 50 years’ imprisonment, whereas homicide by 
adult perpetrators is generally only punished with a sentence of up to 35 years, and up to 7 
years for minors. More than one sentence can be concatenated however, so that a single 
individual can be sentenced to up to 75 years for several offences. 
The left-wing opposition party FMLN views the current violence as a “latent threat to 
the state and society” (González, M. 2006), but has put together its strategy for containing 
violent crime rather late in the day, far later even than the government. This was also ini-
tially focused exclusively on post-war political violence, so as to interpret opposition as 
merely “saying no” in the issue of violence. This changed with the elaboration of the 
FMLN platform for the presidential election in 2004. For this the FMLN conceived a pro-
gramme of shock tactics to address organized crime, but a very soft strategy on the other 
hand to deal with young people who had fallen foul of the law, i.e. the maras, which pri-
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oritized prevention and reintegration. The FMLN justified this in retrospect with the (er-
roneous) argument that the maras at this point had no links with organized crime yet. The 
FMLN furthermore pursued this position so as to distinguish themselves from ARENA in 
terms of strategy. In the minds of the population, for their part seriously disturbed by the 
violence, this created the impression that the FMLN, unlike the government, were seeking 
to avoid any kind of severity in their dealings with perpetrators of violence, and had 
joined forces with them. Government supporters accordingly fanned the flames of this 
impression. The basic problem – not only for the FMLN, but also for the government and 
population in general – is a misunderstanding over the interpretation of “severity”. No 
one side has understood that severity when dealing with criminal offences does not have 
to mean being repressive, but simply being consistent in imposing punishment under the 
rule of law. In the mean time, however, as emphasized by Hugo Martínez, member of 
parliament for the FMLN, even the FMLN have now come to view the maras as criminal 
organizations and are now tending towards striking a balance between preventive and 
coercive measures to deal with the maras, since at the end of the day the victims have to be 
protected first and foremost. In response to the author’s observation that there was now 
barely any distinction between the FMLN strategy and that of the government, Martínez 
replied that the government had indeed adopted the viewpoint of the FMLN, but was not 
yet acting upon it, which the FMLN on the other hand would do, were they in govern-
ment office (Martínez, H. 2006).11 
4.2.2.2 Institutions 
Police 
The Salvadoran police force is nowadays apolitical, in accordance with the law forbidding 
police officers from belonging to a political party. The influence of the FMLN on the po-
lice and above all its command, which was considerable until the mid 1990s, has declined 
sharply, in contrast to that on the judiciary. The FMLN describes it as a failure to have 
allowed itself to agree, thinking that the other side was doing to the same, to do without 
its political influence in the police (Martínez, H. 2006). On the whole the police suffer 
from inadequate internal and external monitoring, militarization, insufficient staff, unsat-
isfactory training, a lack of any transparent command structure, low salaries and poor 
equipment (Martínez Ventura 2005: 295-303). Police officers are discontented, demoti-
vated and demoralized. In the case of the police the combination of poor performance 
and repressive behaviour can be shown in four points: 
Slim resources and poor equipment: Of the 14,000 police officers operational during the 
war – counting other security bodies and FMLN as well, there were 75,000 public security 
 
 
11 If one questions mayors about deficiencies in the current government strategy to tackle violence, the gulf 
between ARENA and FMLN appears less wide than at the central level. Completely independently of 
which party they belong to, the mayors urge concertation between government and opposition on these 
issues, but more importantly a decentralization of this policy and autonomy for the municipalities (Ortíz 
2006; Vilanova 2006). 
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employees at that time – only 6,000 remained in the first instance after the war ended 
(Costa 1999: 149). Even by 1996 the police had no presence in 73 out of 262 municipali-
ties (La Prensa 1996: 3). In the interim this number has risen to 15,000 police officers. 
Bearing in mind the small surface area and population count, this is not an insignificant 
number by Central American standards. However, according to Comisionado Pablo de 
Jesús Escobar Baños, deputy director of domestic security for the police, in order for the 
police to operate as they should and achieve the requisite quota of 3 police officers per 
1,000 citizens, this figure should be 23,000 police officers. However, this would exceed the 
budget (Escobar 2006). A “purge” carried out in 2000-2001, as a result of which 2,400 
police officers had to leave their jobs, did not comply with the employment law then in 
force. Police officers are not paid enough, receiving USD 300 which is the minimum wage. 
Between 2000 and 2005 the police suffered 56 fatalities (FESPAD 2005: 35). All this has led 
to a loss of staff. Although the homicide rate has risen since 2003, the share of expenditure 
allocated for the police in the total national budget fell from 7.05 % in 2000 to 4.81 % in 
2004 (Martínez Ventura 2005: 332). However in comparison to their counterparts in 
Guatemala and Honduras the Salvadoran police still qualify as the more professional and 
better equipped with more staff and resources; nevertheless the homicide rate here is 
higher than in both other countries.  
Human rights abuses and arbitrariness: Following a promising start after the signing of 
the peace accord, the new national civil police force has almost fully returned to the same 
repressive, incompetent, and indifferent (towards further education) model that existed 
under the dictatorship, according to Human Rights Ombudswoman, Beatrice Alamanni 
de Carrillo. She goes on to say that in the last five years in particular, there has been a dis-
astrous and complete deterioration in spirit, morality and behaviour in the police force. 
Even the command is once again in the hands of the stick-in-the-muds. Furthermore, she 
continues, it is not the ex-soldiers or ex-guerrilleros who are abusing human rights in the 
police. On the contrary, it is police officers of the new generation instead. A good police 
officer receives no support from the supreme police command. The problem is therefore 
not a technical one, but an economic and political one. She observes that there is simply 
no interest in the police becoming how people anticipated they would be following the 
peace accord. The police are either involved in “social cleansing” activities themselves, or 
they turn a blind eye to them, by not carrying out any investigations. The rumour that 
“social cleansing” is perpetrated by former death squads is, she says, a false one; on the 
contrary, this cleansing now has no political objective of any kind (Alamanni de Carrillo 
2007). The police in El Salvador are the one state institution against which the Human 
Rights Ombudswoman has the most complaints of human rights abuses. In 2003, from 
January to November, they accounted for more than 40 % of all such complaints (Pro-
curaduría 2003: 2). Some 300 complaints a day are brought against police officers (Ala-
manni de Carrillo 2007). Whereas in the 1990s the police were not once accused of tor-
ture, it has to be assumed that since 2000 they have been carrying out systematic torture 
to obtain information or exact revenge. The biggest sensation has been caused by the tor-
ture perpetrated in the presence of former police commissioner, Mauricio Sandoval. 
Links with organized crime: According to Alamanni de Carrillo there is evidence to sug-
gest that police behaviour is seriously illegal, and that they have clear links with organized 
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crime (Alamanni de Carrillo 2007). There is a large group of police officers who cooperate 
with organized crime. “Taxes” extorted by the maras find their way even into the upper 
echelons of the police chain of command (Alamanni de Carrillo 2007). As even their 
commissioner acknowledges, the police have been infiltrated by the maras (Ávila 2006). 
The Ombudswoman has an anecdote from her own personal experience to add to the lack 
of any political will to address its own criminality on the part of supreme police com-
mand: when it came to light that for over two years one of the police officers who was 
guarding her was head of a criminal organization and she complained about this to the 
police commissioner, the latter greeted her agitation with a lack of sympathy; after all, this 
person had also worked in his office for a considerable length of time (Alamanni de 
Carrillo 2007).  
Militarization: As they are unable to get violence under control, the police are sup-
ported by the army in realizing their task of ensuring domestic security, although consti-
tutionally speaking the army is only responsible for external security. In any event, the 
constitution gives the president the possibility of seeking assistance from the armed forces 
in the event of a threat to domestic security, and the latter are under police command in 
joint patrols (Grupos de Tareas Conjuntas). 
Judiciary 
In contrast to the police, there was no “purging”12 of human rights abusers in the judici-
ary, it is true, but in the course of transition progress can be noted here too: the number 
of courts has been doubled, more judges than before are being appointed, and judges to 
the Supreme Court are no longer directly elected by parliament (and therefore essentially 
by the executive) as they were during the dictatorship, but instead proposed 50 % by the 
Consejo Nacional de Judicatura and 50 % by lawyers as a body. Only then can parliament 
elect members of the Supreme Court from the list compiled in this way, with a two-thirds 
majority. The Supreme Court more or less reflects a balance between judges who are sym-
pathetic to the FMLN and to ARENA, but this is repeatedly called into question by 
ARENA. Schools specializing in further education for law were also founded, which all 
judges have to attend. Within criminal law, there was a transformation from the principle 
of inquisition to that of accusation – more acceptable under the rule of law. However this 
has since begun to exhibit characteristics of the principle of inquisition more strongly 
once again.13 In the case of the judiciary, the combination of poor performance and a lack 
of law and order, along with tolerance of repressive behaviour, which results in exemption 
from punishment to a high degree, can be shown in three ways:  
Little independence: The judiciary is manipulated for political gain and is anything but 
independent (Ortíz Ruíz 2006; Santos Mejía de Escobar 2007). The executive repeatedly 
 
 
12 In Spanish: depuración; in German „Säuberung“ 
13 The principle of accusation means that criminal prosecution in court only happens if a charge is success-
fully brought. The conduct giving rise to the accusation must be described sufficiently clearly in an in-
dictment or equivalent ruling. In the case of the principle of inquisition, on the other hand, the judge can 
initiate proceedings based on a report or any other kind of suspicion and conduct the case themselves un-
til a ruling is reached.  
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intervenes in their affairs. De facto public prosecutors and the Supreme Court are put 
together in accordance with the balance of political power, and they are also subsequently 
politically dependent. The Supreme Court is a disaster, according even to Ex-President 
Cristiani, one of the earliest prominent representatives of national law, who lends his 
voice to the criticism (Cristiani 2006). From time to time, for example until April 2006, 
there were key positions such as that of chief public prosecutor which remained unfilled 
for several months because politicians were unable to reach agreement so as to be able to 
appoint somebody who would be anything other than politically independent. It is true 
that the Consejo Nacional de Judicatura proposes judges for the Supreme Court, but their 
selection is then in part boycotted and other judges in part appointed. This is described as 
promotion, replacement or transfer. A third of judges are appointed to their posts in ex-
actly this way. The other two thirds date from the days of the dictatorship (Vidales 2006).  
Poor attitude towards law and order: The manipulation of the judiciary for political 
gain is not perceived to be such by all protagonists, naturally, especially not by those who 
benefit from this political manipulation by the government (party). These latter do not 
complain about there being too little, but too much independence of the judiciary, too 
much administrative freedom, which (they claim) leads to disorder, and of too little sub-
ordination of the judges to higher authorities, in particular the Supreme Court. Judges 
would abuse their independence by applying their own criteria when sentencing and by 
failing to apply laws, claiming that they were unconstitutional. Legality within penal legis-
lation, as has been in force since the criminal law and code of criminal procedure of 1998, 
would be interpreted formalistically, by placing too much weight on the presumption of 
innocence and the precision of the evidence, even in those cases where it was clear who 
the perpetrator was and therefore completely reasonable simply to establish their guilt. 
For that reason El Salvador is a state under the rule of law for the benefit of criminals, but 
not for victims (Guzmán 2007).  
Besides voices such as these, which complain about the exaggerated, because it is “for-
malistic”, implementation of the law, there are also, even at ministerial level, critics who 
regard the laws themselves as being the greatest evil. They talk about a “sistema (ul-
tra)garantista for the benefit of criminals” , which is “too much under the rule of law”, “at 
least for the first fifteen years following the end of the war”. While the police are “súper 
dura”, the judiciary are “súper blanda”. This is not a good combination (Barrera 2006). 
Roberto Vidales, legal specialist at FUSADES (the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic 
and Social Development), sees the evil as lying on the other hand in the inversion: “Here 
laws are made not to be kept. Instead of imposing them, new legal reforms keep being 
passed, which are then not imposed either” (Vidales 2006). Judges, for their part, empha-
size their independence and their right or rather their duty not to impose unconstitutional 
laws and, as in the case of the Ley Anti-Mara for example, also always to release presumed 
perpetrators if there is insufficient evidence against them. Judges concede that by doing 
this, guilty people also walk free, which increases exemption from punishment. However, 
they emphasize that the principles of law and order such as presumption of innocence and 
burden of proof are valid also and especially for criminals. They claim that the executive 
has been carrying out a campaign against them, branding them as friends of crime and 
communists. This in turn has ultimately led, they say, to many of them “indiscriminately” 
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complying with the law, with the result that increasing numbers of guilty, but also of in-
nocent, individuals are being sent to prison. The prisons are becoming extremely over-
crowded and mainly turning into “crime universities” for young people, from which they 
emerge as criminals even if they were not criminals when they went in. After all, 38 % of 
prison inmates have not been convicted of anything (Santos Mejía de Escobar 2007).  
Incompetence: The fact that evidence is repeatedly insufficient, irrelevant or illegal is 
due primarily to the lack of investigative proceedings by the police. However, according to 
law investigative proceedings have to be ordered and monitored by the public prosecu-
tor’s office. This is a new task for the public prosecutor’s office. Public prosecutors do not 
know how to go about executing it, while police officers, especially those from the old 
police force, have enough experience to carry out investigative proceedings under their 
own steam. On the one hand the public prosecutor’s office keeps trying to delegate inves-
tigation and the responsibility for it entirely to the police, and on the other hand the po-
lice are refusing to accept any kind of responsibility including that which they actually do 
have for investigation. The public prosecutor’s office is, for its part, put together accord-
ing to political calculations and not competence, with the result that it lacks the will or the 
competence to take on the responsibility of investigative proceedings – and so the story 
begins all over again. The level of education in the legal sector is low, in the opinion of 
Roberto Vidales, even lower than during the days of the dictatorship. This is not due to 
the laws, but to the individuals. The basic problem is that legal professionals are not se-
lected for their merit and competence, but for their political loyalties to the parties “There 
are judges”, explains Vidales, “whom I would consider to be illiterate.” False references or 
diplomas from the PR China are the order of the day (Vidales 2006).  
Technically speaking, serious deficiencies are most apparent primarily in criminal in-
vestigation and witness protection. The result is a level of exemption from punishment of 
way in excess of 90 %, even in the case of reported homicides (Vidales 2006; Flores 2006). 
Only 10 % of those arrested provisionally by the police are taken into custody, and of 
these only 5 % are convicted (Santos Mejía de Escobar 2007), with the rest serving a 
prison sentence without any conviction. 55 % of court cases end in acquittal or with the 
case being dismissed (Martínez Ventura 2005: 363). 
Penal system 
In 2006 there were 19 penal institutions in El Salvador with 12,500 individuals held in 
custody, including 3,500 mareros. They represent 26 % of inmates. Of these, 62.6 % be-
longed to the MS and 36.6 % to Barrio 18 (Vilanova Chica 2006). Mareros are not neces-
sarily serving a prison sentence for homicide, so that even from this situation in the pris-
ons it can be seen that mareros most probably are responsible for far less than half of all 
homicides. The mareros are accommodated separately from the other inmates in deten-
tion centres. Both maras are also held separately from each other. The penal system exhib-
its mainly the following two failings:  
Overcrowding and inhumane prison conditions: The penal system is undergoing a seri-
ous crisis, as the state is not in a position to administer imprisonment in a humane way. 
As a consequence of the contrareforma of the codes of criminal law and criminal proce-
From Exodus to Exitus 33
 
 
dure the number of prison inmates has risen from about 7,000 (in 1999) to more than 
12,000 (2004, 2005 and 2006). If this rhythm is maintained, the number of prisoners will 
rise to over 19,000 by 2009 (Procuraduría 2004: 6f). Only 62 % of inmates have been con-
victed. Salvadoran penal institutions are on average overcrowded by around 175 %, as 
they have a real capacity for 6,000. There are sensational cases in which up to 70 individu-
als are packed together into a shared cell (Procuraduría 2006: 11). 35 inmates in dormito-
ries which are designed for 15 is the norm, as in Centro Penal Quetzaltepeque. Not all 
prisoners have a bed here; there is no centralized serving of meals: the prisoners have to be 
self-sufficient. The penal institution has neither psychologist nor priest. If inmates want to 
work, they can only do so with their own resources. They are locked up in their cells for 
11 hours, without any dedicated guard (Martínez, V. 2006). During this time those in-
formal power structures of mareros are created, which repeatedly explode into clashes.  
In the so-called solitary confinement cells the prisoners have to relieve themselves into 
holes sunk into the floor of the cell. They use the same holes to wash themselves. Alterna-
tively they relieve themselves into plastic bags which are left in the cell. The cells are ex-
posed to sun and rain, cockroaches, rats and flies. There have been cases brought to light 
of tear gas being fed into the cells. In particular, prisoners awaiting trial are not provided 
with any food, unless the police officers on duty pay for this out of their own pocket. The 
“cuartos de risa” (laughter rooms) in Apopa achieved a macabre notoriety, named for the 
laughter of those on duty there over the twitchings of prisoners who were being subjected 
to electric shocks. These rooms now reportedly no longer exist.  
Lack of supervision and increasing criminalization: One of the consequences of over-
crowding is prison massacres. On 18 August 2004 during a clash between prisoners at the 
Penitenciaría Central La Esperanza 31 inmates were killed and 30 wounded. This was the 
biggest prison massacre in El Salvador since 1993. This particular penal institution was 
overcrowded by 305 %. This means it had 1,638 more inmates than the space available. 
The most recent example of a prison massacre is at Centro Penal Apanteos, where 21 in-
mates died between 5 and 6 January 2007. Although this violent action had been in the 
air, the authorities took no preventive measures of any kind. This penal institution is 
overcrowded by 146 % (Procuraduría 2006: 30). The mareros conduct their mirins in 
prison without any problem, organizing criminal actions by mobile phone and being sup-
plied with drugs14 and weapons by visitors. They are also able to conduct their satanic 
rituals, likewise without any problem. The prison walls are covered with graffiti, in which 
gravestone upon gravestone, but also the names of murdered friends and the devil, can be 
seen. Over years the mareros have subjugated these surrounding to their psyche. “They 
have made the detention centre into their ‘casa destroyer’”, comments the Roman Catho-
lic priest and expert on the maras quoted above. Imprisonment was no punishment for 
the mareros. They already knew that they had no future (Civilian in 2006). In spite of 
these serious failings, the director of the Salvadoran penal system in office at the time of 
 
 
14 The former head of the Salvadoran penal system, Roberto Vilanova, considered it deeply regrettable that it 
is legally forbidden to carry out manual searches of visitors, including especially women, for drugs hidden 
in their genital areas (Vilanova Chica 2006). 
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this interview, Jaime Roberto Vilanova, made the following robust declaration to the au-
thor: “We consider human rights to be fundamental. There is no violence in the prisons” 
(Vilanova Chica 2006). 
All in all, in El Salvador’s post-war domestic security policy there has been a strategic 
transformation in favour of a more sophisticated strategy, better endowed with preventive 
and integrative elements, but on the whole nonetheless more repressive, which – as can be 
seen from the homicide rates – is not only unproductive, but counter-productive. The 
strategies have no relation at all to the causes of violence. There is no weakest link in the 
security sector, be it police, judiciary or penal system. Police and judiciary alike are char-
acterized by a similar pendulum movement: transition to a more democratic regime 
(more pronounced in the police than in the judiciary) in the first five years following the 
end of the war, followed in the case of both institutions by a turn towards more repressive 
behaviour. A continuing extremely high level of inefficiency (failing performance) on the 
part of these institutions is now accompanied by their highest level of repressive behav-
iour, imposed on them by corresponding government strategies, and it can therefore not 
be balanced out by these. All three institutions listed above systematically violate the right 
to life, increasingly in a direct way, but also still in an indirect way, through failure to act. 
5. Conclusions 
In this report it has been empirically proven that in El Salvador within the enabling and 
preventive structures for violence, which generally exist or are absent respectively in the 
extremely violent countries of Central America, and which manifest themselves here as 
rent economy and regime hybridity, there are two factors in this form and combination 
specific to this country, which cause the region’s highest level of violence here: these are 
on the one hand the extremely high rates of migration and remittances, and on the other 
the security sector characterized by its poor performance and repressive behaviour. As far 
as the rate of migration and remittances are concerned, by Central American standards 
these are at this level just as unique to El Salvador as the level of violence. At the same 
time they are constant as factors, inasmuch as they are increasing steadily and continually, 
i.e. without any jumps.  
The four questions raised in Chapter 2 can be answered as follows: while the extremely 
high rates of migration and remittances explain the fundamentally high level of the post-
war rate of violence in El Salvador, the strategies and configurations of the security sector 
trigger the decisive factor in both the peaks and the trough of the homicide rate: its sine 
curve reached its first peak when the security sector institutions were not yet operational. 
It sank into a trough when the new police force and judiciary were established, and these 
had achieved their highest level of democratic form to date, and when a newly imple-
mented repressive security policy had not yet been able to unleash its devastating effect at 
this point. The second peak in the sine curve corresponds with when further progress with 
performance in the security sector was not made, the democratic form dwindled and re-
pressive behaviour increased.  
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Socioeconomic deprivation, as I have shown, is the order of the day in the case of post-
war El Salvador: on the one hand there is a high level of relative deprivation, which is con-
nected with the bipolarity of the highest and lowest quintiles. El Salvador possesses a ho-
mogenous oligarchic nucleus and a comparatively very poor lowest quintile. The possibil-
ity of falling into this hangs like the sword of Damocles above the heads of those in the 
second and third quintiles, especially in view of the enormous insecurity of the labour 
market. Both quintiles suffer at the same time from a relatively low level of relative depri-
vation by Central American standards, and particularly in comparison with others in their 
own quintile or in the next highest quintile, rather than with the very highest, which does 
not provoke any less frustration than a high level of relative deprivation. 
The fact that it is those belonging to the second and third quintiles who represent the 
majority of perpetrators of violence in El Salvador, is directly connected with this: on the 
one hand, if they are not already unemployed, they are conscious of a particularly high 
level of insecurity in the labour market (for example in the informal sector); on the other, 
if they do have work, they are discontented with their, falling, wage and compare it with 
lucrative alternatives in the USA. As everybody basically does, the Salvadorans compare 
themselves to others, especially to their own kind, i.e. those from the same or the adjoin-
ing quintile. Remittances are the decisive factor for who among their kind in the second 
and third quintiles has a better standard of living. But not every member of these two 
quintiles by a long way is able to shoulder the economic and emotional transaction costs 
necessary for a migration for the sake of remittances. It follows from this that those be-
longing to the second and third quintiles compare themselves with those who either 
(unlike them) already receive or are still receiving remittances, or else are getting more 
remittances, and so have a slightly better standard of living than they do. The person af-
fected by this, whether in reality or in their perception, gets themselves the remittances 
they lack for such a standard of living – by means of violence. The more successful they 
are in doing this, the easier it appears to them to be, ultimately to achieve the standard of 
living typical even of the top two quintiles.  
While relevant specialists on political violence are of the opinion that, in keeping with 
the rational cost-benefit calculation, individual advancement is an alternative to (politi-
cal) violence, this does not hold for violent crime, which does not call the status quo into 
question. It is true that individual advancement here appears to be possible via migration 
and remittances, and so it is, however it suddenly gets called into question whether be-
cause of a failed migration attempt or return home due to deportation. Even in these 
cases, however, the discontented do not join efforts as a political force against the status 
quo, but attempt to achieve individual advancement in another way, namely by using 
violent crime to access the market. Even if those affected organize themselves into maras, 
they do so for the sake of advancing their own economic or personal status and not to 
change the system. In other words, not only are the maras no collective alternative plan to 
the political status quo, but they also operate only for as long as individual advancement is 
possible through being in or using them.  
The present exodus of Salvadorans, just like their “exitus” (death) in large numbers, is a 
symbol of a perverse globalization: labour at home is becoming - in addition - devalued, 
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because it is being offloaded across the borders through migration or a labour market which 
is globalized but at the same time in difficulties, with labour no longer being in demand in 
the home country, and even the labour that remains not being absorbed because the capital 
goods industry is not being expanded. The resulting labour abroad generates remittances 
and therefore an income which crosses borders, and which for its part devalues labour in the 
home country, because it makes consumption there possible without production, i.e. with-
out labour. Remittances are a new but at the same time classic case for the globalization of 
rent, with which the development of a worldwide civilized (non-violent) civilian society is 
being impeded (Elsenhans 2006: 211). Both those who earn the remittances (because they 
and their children have been socialized in the violent environment of America) and the 
“undeserving” recipients (because they have been released from having to work and at the 
same time are complaining about a lack of remittances), but also those whose contact with 
the remittances is limited “only” to awareness of them, as they do not have access to such an 
income themselves, come into contact with violence. Violence is, or appears to them to be, 
the only or at least the most easily accessed substitute for access to the market, especially to 
make money. The cross-border offloading of labour and income in this way causes violence 
that transcends borders and regions, via the intermediary link of relative deprivation. The 
maras, who personify this violence the most strongly, are on the one hand a consequence of 
the perverse economic globalization of rent, and are on the other themselves globalized, as 
they have a presence way beyond Central America. On the one hand migrants end up fund-
ing violence, in this case violent crime, with their remittances, similarly to the diaspora in 
the “new wars” (although in this case it is unintentional). On the other hand the financial 
influx from remittances is ultimately swallowed up by the costs of the violence. Relating to 
society as a whole, there is not only a causal connection between exodus and “exitus”, but 
also the most disastrous lose-lose situation which it is possible to imagine.  
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